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ABSTRACT 
 
Given the destabilizing effect which conflicts have had on Africa‟s socio-economic and 
political development, attempts have been (and are still being) made by a combination of 
state and non-state actors towards ensuring the prevention of  conflicts before they occur, 
including the setting up of the required capacity to deal with them.  Epitomizing this tradition 
is Nigeria, which courtesy of its regional hegemonic status and geographic location as well as 
its military and economic strength has been one of the leading nations in conflict resolution, 
peace building and peacekeeping in Africa. In view of the foregoing, this study revisits 
Nigeria‟s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, through an analysis of its role within 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-sponsored projects; such as the 
Nigerian-led military intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. Using the realist 
approach as its framework of analysis and content analysis as its research methodology, the 
study interrogates the connection between Nigeria‟s interventionist role in Africa and the 
possible nexus or otherwise with its foreign policy dictates. The study further examines the 
gains or otherwise that have been achieved courtesy of the Africanization of Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy objectives from 1960 to 2010; and the probable factors responsible for the much 
„politicized‟ shift to citizen diplomacy. The study reveals that what is presently at play is a 
continuation of Nigeria‟s traditional Afro-centric posture and advocates the need for Nigeria 
to put an end to its seemingly „charity inclined foreign policy orientation‟. It recommends a 
re-definition of Nigeria‟s foreign policy focus to accommodate a „People first‟ approach 







      
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION ....................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION ......................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... iv 
TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................................ vi 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. vii 
 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Background to the Study ........................................... 1 
1.1 Background to the Study ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Statement of Problem ........................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Scope of the Study ............................................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Limitations of the Study....................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Significance of the Study ..................................................................................................... 6 
1.6 Objectives of the Study ........................................................................................................ 6 
1.7 Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 7 
1.8 Main Hypothesis .................................................................................................................. 7 
1.9 Theoretical Framework: Rethinking the Utility of the Realist Approach............................ 7 
1.10.Research Methodology and Study Design ....................................................................... 10 
 
CHAPTER TWO: A Literature Review on the Notion of Conflict Resolution and 
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy ........................................................................................................ 13 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 13 
2.2 Defining Conflict ............................................................................................................... 14 
          2.2.1 Conflict Prevention ................................................................................................. 16 
          2.2.2 Conflict Management ............................................................................................. 17 
          2.2.3 Conflict Resolution ................................................................................................. 19 
          2.2.4 Intervention ............................................................................................................. 20 




      
2.3 Conceptualizing Foreign Policy ......................................................................................... 26 
           2.3.1 The Primacy of the National Interest ..................................................................... 28 
           2.3.2 Understanding Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy ............................................................... 29 
           2.3.3 Centripetal determinants of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy ........................................... 30 
           2.3.4 The Centrifugal determinants of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy ................................... 31 
           2.3.5 Fundamental Principles of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy ............................................. 33 
 
2.4 Reconsidering the Utility of Diplomacy ............................................................................ 38 
2.5 Conceptualizing Citizen Diplomacy .................................................................................. 41 
2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 44 
  
CHAPTER THREE: Nigeria’s Interventionist Role in the Liberian Civil War: The 
Myths and Realities of Pax Nigeriana 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 45 
3.2 The Historical Evolution of the Liberian State .................................................................. 45 
3.3 The Samuel Doe Era in Liberia ......................................................................................... 47 
3.4 Nigeria in Liberia: Between Personal and National Interest ............................................. 48 
3.5 Three Alternative Explanation(s) for Nigeria‟s Involvement in Liberia ........................... 53 
3.6 The International Dimension to the Crisis ......................................................................... 56 
3.7 Assessing Post-conflict Reconstruction Efforts in Liberia ................................................ 59 
3.8 Rethinking the Human Development Crisis in Liberia...................................................... 64 
3.9 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 68 
 
Chapter FOUR: The Nigerian State, its Foreign Policy Institutions and its History with 
Conflict Resolution in Africa 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 70 
4.2 The Nigerian State in Brief ................................................................................................ 70 




      
4.4 Regime Type, Foreign Policy Orientation and Commitment to Afro-centrism ................ 78 
4.5 Nigeria‟s Role in Sub-Regional Security  .......................................................................... 89 
4.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 88 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of findings.......................................................................................................... 93 
5.2 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 95 
5.3 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 97 
 
6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources: Text Books ................................................................................................ 100 
References: Related Researches: Unpublished Thesis .......................................................... 105 
References: Journal Publications and Articles ....................................................................... 106 





1.1 Background to the Study 
In the past fifty-two (52) years (1960-2012), Africa has been plagued by a multiplicity of civil 
wars and protracted conflicts. Notable among such conflicts were the Darfur crises in Western 
Sudan which erupted in 2004, the Chadian conflicts from 1975 to 2008, the unending post-
Mobutu Sese Seko crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo which dates back to 1998, the 
Mozambican civil war from 1977 to 1992, the Angolan crisis from 1975 to 2002, the Western 
Sahara conflict between the Polisario movement and the Morrohaqis (1975 to 1991), and the 
genocide in Rwanda (1994), among others (Obiekwe, 2009:1). Given the destabilizing effect 
which these conflicts have had on Africa‟s socio-economic and political development, it has 
become imperative for state and non-state actors to set up the required capacity to deal with 
them.   
 
Motivated by the need to put an end to these quagmires, the African Union (AU) adopted a 
resolution at its extra-ordinary session held in Tripoli, Libya in February 2004 to commission 
a peacekeeping force known as the Rapid Action Peacekeeping Force (RAPF). The RAPF 
was conceived as a mechanism that can effectively guarantee continental peace and security. 
This move is seen as a follow-up to other instruments of African solidarity and cohesion such 
as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD), and the African Defense and Security Policy (ADSP) (Adedeji and 
Zabadi, 2004:20). 
 
These institutional frameworks also led to the setting up of a Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) whose major responsibility is to prevent conflict and a Continental Early Warning 
System (CEWS), expected to serve as an operational instrument for conflict prevention. The 
onus for ensuring the success of these efforts thus fell on sub-regional organizations on the 
continent as they are expected to provide the political and economic support required for the 
successful implementation of these initiatives. Prominent among these organizations are; the 




      
Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development   
(IGAD) in East Africa and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).   
 
On an international level, attempts have also been (and are still being) made  by a 
combination of state and non-state actors towards ensuring the resolution and prevention of 
these conflicts, particularly by non-state actors endowed with the political, economic and 
military resources to do so. According to Kuna (2006:1-2) and Adebajo (2008:12), Nigeria, 
courtesy of its hegemonic status1, geographic location, economic strength and military 
capabilities has been taking a definitive role in conflict resolution in Africa, from its 
attainment of independence in 1960 to date (2012). This is evident in the series of peace-
oriented initiatives the country has undertaken in West Africa in particular and in Africa in 
general. Examples of these interventions include: Nigeria‟s involvement in the Congolese 
civil war of 1960, the Chadian crisis of 1979-82, the Liberian civil war of 1990 to 1997, the 
Guinea-Bissau political unrest of 1998 to 2000, the Sierra Leonean civil war of 1991 to 2002, 
and the Ivorian crisis of 1997 to 2002, among others (Fawole, 2003).  
 
Whil analyzing Nigeria‟s role in conflict management within and outside Africa, Kuna; 
(2005:3-4) noted that such an analysis could be best situated within the context of the 
country‟s foreign objectives. On attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted a pro-
West, non-aligned and Africa-oriented foreign policy posture. It is however imperative to 
note that the above assumption has been subject to various contending arguments among 
scholars. Idisi and Idise (1996:169) note that this argument is divided between two camps: 
those who believe that Nigeria‟s Africa-centred foreign policy concentration is blatantly 
pursued without any specific regard for the country‟s domestic interests and economic woes 
and; those who maintain that Nigeria, by virtue of its huge socio-economic and military 
resources, has the responsibility to do so. This later school of thought is composed mainly of 
the National Interest, the Prestige, the Economic Diplomacy and the Hegemonic Stability 
schools of thought.  
  
Idisi & Idise (1996:171) argue that the underlying assumption of the Prestige school of 
thought is that Nigeria, by virtue of being a force to be reckoned with in Africa, is 
                                                          
1Hegemonic status as used here refers to the economic, political and military capabilities cum reputation of   
Nigeria on the continent. Other examples of hegemonic powers on the continent are the Republic of South 




      
predestined to lead in the promotion of peace, as well as in championing Africa‟s socio-
economic and political development. Such an assertion perhaps informed Ebohon and 
Obakhedo‟s (2012: 163) observation that: 
 
Playing such a noble role in the economic construction and reconstruction of 
the region presents Nigeria with an opportunity to assert her dominant position 
in the region as a matter of prestige. Analysts argue that if Nigeria fails to do 
so, other credible and contending regional challengers such as Ghana, Egypt, 
Cote d’ Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) and South Africa would take on such 
responsibilities (Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012: 163)). 
 
In examining Nigeria‟s role in conflict resolution in Africa, the Economic Diplomacy school 
of thought argues that such a role could contribute meaningfully towards ending the plethora 
of intrastate and interstate crises which have become the defining characteristics of most 
states in the sub-region and on the continent. Moreover, it also believed that Nigeria, by 
virtue of its being at the forefront of regional economic integration and transformation will 
help to facilitate a socio-economic and political environment conducive to economic growth 
and progress (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2012:163). Such progress is impossible if the 
atmosphere of war and instability is allowed to remain unchecked; according to Ebohon and 
Obakhedo (2012:163), this brings to the fore the nexus between politics and economics in 
inter-state relations. 
 
Similarly and in line with the argument often advanced by the proponents of the Hegemonic 
Stability school of thought, Rugumamu (2004: 9) citing Keohane (1980) argues that it is the 
duty of the hegemon to champion the cause of cooperation and integration by showing the 
less willing and less able countries the way.  He adds that this is necessary in order to 
overcome the difficulties often associated with countries having to move on at the same pace 
and within the same time-frame. Rugumamu (2004: 10) further argues that the economic 
strength and political stability of any hegemon (such as Nigeria) is capable of strengthening 
the region‟s economic vitality and political stability; this inevitably supports regional 
economic integration. Consequently and in line with Ebohon and Obakhedo‟s (2012: 163) 
argument, Nigeria‟s leadership role in the politico-economic and military activities of both 
ECOWAS and the AU have often been premised on the underlying assumptions of the theory 




      
 
Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012: 163) argue that this hegemonic presence is believed to have the 
capacity to serve as a positive force for developing and nurturing a viable economic and 
cooperative arrangement, as well as building a regional peace and security system. It can 
therefore be concluded, as Agedah (1993:145) observed, that the above schools of thought 
are of the opinion that Nigeria‟s assumption of an “altruistic big brother role” in the sub-
region and indeed on the continent is in response to the fulfilment of its manifest destiny of 
promoting the African cause and its unity.  
 
However, after close to five decades of the pursuance of an Afro-centric foreign policy drive, 
the Nigerian government announced a shift in foreign policy orientation in 2007 from its 
hitherto Africa-centered ideology to what the erstwhile Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ojo 
Maduekwe, conceptualized as “citizen diplomacy” (Bakare, 2007). Citizen diplomacy, as 
construed by Nigeria, implies the country‟s adherence to a foreign policy approach essentially 
premised on the protection, expansion and advancement of the national interests of the 
country and her people (Mbachu, 2007).   
 
According to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ojo Maduekwe) the term does not 
necessarily mean a departure from the country‟s traditional Africa-centered foreign policy 
posture. Rather, it advocates for a re-channeling of foreign policy orientation to cater for the 
yearnings, aspirations, wellbeing and the national interest(s) of Nigeria and its people. This 
new foreign policy drive, therefore, seeks to address the ostensible priority placed on Africa 
by the preceding foreign policy focus and to also strive for a synergy between the broad issues 
encapsulated in Nigeria‟s domestic and foreign policy concentration (Mbachu, 2007). 
 
Informed by this introduction, this study attempts an appraisal of Nigeria‟s approach towards 
conflict resolution in Africa. In doing so, it undertakes an assessment of the ECOWAS-
sponsored and Nigeria-led military intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. This is 
crucial to establish the underlying motive(s) behind Nigeria‟s commitment of resources to the 
resolution of the conflict which could have been used to provide social infrastructure and 




      
otherwise that have been achieved through the Africanization2 of Nigeria‟s foreign policy 
goals, the feasibility of its new foreign policy approach of citizen diplomacy and its 
implications for Nigeria‟s commitment to peace in Africa.  
1.2 Statement of Problem 
After about forty seven (47) years of the operationalization of an Africa-centered foreign 
policy drive, in 2007 the Nigerian government announced a shift to citizen diplomacy. 
Against this backdrop, this study intends to unravel the underlying motive(s) behind the 
seeming redirection of Nigeria‟s foreign policy from Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy. 
Using Nigeria‟s interventionist role in the Liberian crisis as its case study, the study aims to 
establish the reasons behind the country‟s interventionist role in Liberia and the possible gains 
or otherwise achieved by virtue of that intervention. Furthermore, the study aims to establish 
the veracity or otherwise of the reported shift in Nigeria‟s traditional Afro-centric posture to 
citizen diplomacy. This will include an examination of the probable nexus or otherwise 
between the shift in foreign policy focus (if any) and the country‟s interventionist role in 
future mediations. Finally, the study aims to identify the possible changes that have occurred 
over time in Nigeria‟s foreign policy goals, particularly as these affect the country‟s 
commitment to conflict resolution in Africa over the past five decades. 
 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
This study will focus on Nigeria‟s role in the resolution of conflicts in Africa, with particular 
focus on Nigeria‟s contribution to the ECOMOG-led intervention in the Liberian crisis. This 
will be examined from the foreign policy perspective of the Nigerian state, with specific focus 
on the existing nexus or otherwise between the Liberian intervention and Nigeria‟s national 
interest. Concrete attempts will also be made to contextualize other interventionist roles 
played by Nigeria in the discharge of its commitment to peace and stability in Africa.   
 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
The study may be constrained by difficulties in gaining access to some relevant materials 
related to the research due to national security restrictions. Issues associated with security are 
classified as official secrets in most countries. Another possible limitation is the use of 
                                                          
2 Africanization refers to the continental domestication of certain parts of a country‟s derivative principles of 




      
secondary data as the study‟s research methodology; more often than not, data gathered 
through this medium may have been sourced previously for other research initiatives. As a 
result, the accuracy, dependability and relevance of such data to the study may be called into 
question. Furthermore, the dearth of literature on citizen diplomacy - a concept which, the 
Nigerian government claims as her present foreign policy focus - might also serve as a 
limitation to the study because of its recent introduction. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The relevance of the study will be appreciated by academics interested in researching 
Nigeria‟s efforts towards conflict resolution and peace building in Africa. The study will 
bring to the fore the social, political and economic impact which the country has brought to 
bear on the continent through her conflict resolution and management efforts. Furthermore, 
the study will attempt to assess the reasons for Nigeria‟s seeming unwillingness to continue 
with its Africa-centered foreign policy approach and the causal factors which prompted the 
embracement of a people first foreign policy approach. Furthermore, the study will be a 
useful guide to academics, resource persons and individuals undertaking a course in foreign 
policy dynamics or conflict resolution - especially those related to the African continent. 
 
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
The study seeks to:  
1. Undertake a critical appraisal of the nexus between Nigeria‟s role in conflict 
resolution in Africa and the protection of its national interests; 
2. Analyze the connection between Nigeria‟s foreign policy objectives and her 
interventionist role in Africa,  
3. Appraise the strategies that have been applied by Nigeria towards conflict resolution 
in Africa with particular emphasis on the Liberian civil war; and; 
4. Examine the rationale behind the shift in Nigeria‟s foreign policy objectives from 
Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy, particularly as it concerns peace building and 






      
1.7 Research Questions 
This study intends to examine the following:  
1. What has been the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Africa? 
2. How are the foreign policy goals of Nigeria related to her interventions in Africa‟s 
troubled regions? 
3. What are the strategies that have been advanced by Nigeria in resolving conflicts in 
Africa? 
4. Has there been any change in Nigeria‟s traditional primary foreign policy objective of 
Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy? If so, how has this affected its interventionist 
policies in Africa?  
 
1.8 Main Hypothesis 
Nigeria‟s interventionist role and commitment to peace and stability in Africa are determined 
by the dictates of its foreign policy objectives. 
 
1.9 Theoretical Framework: Rethinking the Utility of the Realist Approach 
According to Bull (1966:20), the traditional and scientific points of view are the two major 
approaches towards understanding the dynamics of the study of foreign policy. The central 
argument embedded in the traditional school of thought stems from the emphasis it places on 
the observance of law, morality, and the use of history in the study of foreign policy and in 
the pursuit of its goals. This  school of thought makes the following key assumptions: that 
states act in a particular way based on their historical experiences and strategic situations and 
that the basic principles of international law (such as respect for the international sovereignty 
of nation-states) are operative in the behavior of all nations in foreign relations; that violating 
basic international laws and morality in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives could be 
detrimental to the cordial relations existing between a state and other nations. The central 
notion of Bull‟s (1966) argument is premised on the necessity and desirability of making 
judgments informed by history, law and a sense of morality; this, in turn, is vital in the 
determination of actions to be taken when relating to external state actors.  
 
In contrast, the main thesis of the scientific point of view is the realist theory. Following its 




      
great debates which occurred during the early 1930s and the 1940s between the inter-war 
idealists and a new generation of Realist writers. This group of scholars included the likes of 
E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Frederick Schuman and George 
Kennan. (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005:163). According to Meinecke (1957:1) the essential 
argument embedded in realism is “premised on the assumption that the state, by virtue of 
being a major player at the international stage must seek and pursue power, and that it is the 
duty of the statesman to calculate realistically the most suitable measure(s) to adopt in order 
to guarantee and protect its interest in a threatening or hostile environment” (Meinecke, 
1957:1). 
 
Dunne and Schmidt (2005), further suggests that realists believe that the survival of the state 
cannot be guaranteed because of the assumption that the use of force in war situations is a 
legitimate instrument of statecraft. They argue that the sole interest of nation-states at the 
international level is to strive for their survival in the midst of competing challenges, and high 
level political volatility. Bearing this in mind, it is also instructive to note that Realism as a 
concept in international relations does not recognize the place of morality or ethics in the 
conduct of international politics. More often than not, Realists are cynical about the argument 
for the existence of universal moral principles. They maintain that the primary responsibility 
of state leaders is to protect the interests of their states and not act in compliance with any 
unfamiliar notion of ethical conduct. 
 
As Morgenthau (1948:25) argued; international politics, like all other aspects of politics, 
remains a struggle for power, and as a result, the basic structure of international politics is 
laden with a high prevalence of anarchy. Consequently, there is a natural tendency for an 
increased incidence of violence in the international system. This scenario arises from the fact 
that every sovereign state considers itself to be its own highest authority and therefore does 
not recognize any other power as being above it. Therefore, and, as a follow-up to this 
struggle for control, domination and relevance at the international level, the main concern of 
state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state, without recourse to the rules of 
engagement or violence.  
 
Dunne and Schmidt (2005:164) further identify classical, structural, neo-classical and 
relational choice realism as the main variants of the realist approach. Classical realism 




      
explains certain dominant features of the international system such as rivalry, fear and war. 
Structural realism maintains the view that the whole idea of the international system is about 
the struggle for power, and that the pervasiveness of insecurity, unhealthy rivalry among 
states and the prevalence of inter-state conflicts in the international system are due to the 
absence of a supreme authority which oversees the affairs of states, including the distribution 
of power in the international system.  
 
Neo-classical realism on the other hand, contends that the systemic account of world politics 
is imperfect and argues for it to be supported by a better account of unit-level variables potent 
enough to effectively determine the perception of power and how it is exercised. Finally, 
advocates of choice realism re-affirm their belief in the all-important role which institutions 
play in international politics, although problems associated with their relative gains, could 
also mean that they exert less causal force, contrary to the view point held by neo-liberals 
(Dunne and Schmidt, 2005:164). 
 
In line with the foregoing, this study aligns itself with the viewpoint of structural realism 
because of its subscription to what Dunne and Schmidt (2005:173-176) call the „three Ss‟ of 
realism; statism, survival and self-help - three fundamental notions which to a large extent 
determine the level and manner of interaction existing in the international system. By way of 
explanation, the chief idea embedded in statism relates to the notion that a state prefers to see 
itself as the only actor on the international stage and, as such, considers every other state as 
less important. The notion of self-help pre-supposes that the idea of co-existence in 
international politics is only achieved when a state is able to maintain a balance of power and 
that limited cooperation is only feasible when a state stands to gain more than others. 
However, the concept of survival; the last of the „three Ss‟ in realism, concerns the protection 
of the supreme national interest which all political leaders must adhere to. This suggests that, 
entrenched in the realist approach is the emphasis it places on the notion and protection of the 
national interest - a term which in the opinion of Abegurin (2003:7) concerns “the means of 
providing the link between trying to understand international politics and the facts to be 
understood”.  
 
Consequently, when situated within the context of foreign policy, realism interrogates the 
role of specific variables such as the economy, leadership proficiency, military capability and 




      
assumptions, scholars such as Idang (1973), Aluko (1981), Ogunsanwo (1986) and Gambari, 
(1989) have argued that the realist approach is relevant in understanding Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy. This assertion is premised on the assumption that Nigeria‟s behavior towards the 
external environment is often anchored on the need to protect its national interest. 
Accordingly, Nigeria‟s national interest, according to Aluko (1981), includes: (1) self-
preservation; (2) defense and maintenance of Nigeria‟s territorial sovereignty; (3) promotion 
of the economic and social wellbeing of its people; (4) to defend, preserve and promote 
democratic values and institutions; and (5) enhancement of Nigeria‟s status in Africa and the 
world through the promotion of world peace. 
 
This, therefore, implies that the foreign policy of any nation is a product of a multiplicity of 
its national interests, and, as Kissinger (1969:27) earlier noted, “foreign policy begins where 
domestic policy ends”. Based on the above, it may be posited, that the notion of national 
interest remains an important consideration in foreign policy formulation. Consequently, and, 
in view of the nexus between Nigeria‟s foreign policy and its interventionist principle in 
Africa, this study interrogates its conflict resolution mechanisms from the point of view of 
the Realist theory. The choice is informed by the emphasis placed on the need to protect the 
national interest as a cardinal reason why states intervene in conflicts.  
 
Therefore, when one considers the intrinsic relationship between what constitutes Nigeria‟s 
national interest,  particularly as it affects Nigeria‟s principle of four concentric circles as 
espoused earlier, the adoption of the theory enables us to put into perspective the seeming 
correlation (or otherwise) between Nigeria‟s national interest and the motivations behind its 
interventionist role in African conflicts. More importantly when approached from the 
perspective of Nigeria‟s seeming adherence to a set of Africa-centered ideology; a policy 
which has been the determinant of Nigeria‟s external behavior and the guiding principle for 
its interventionist activities in Africa over the last fifty-two years (1969-2012). 
 
1.10 Research Methodology and Study Design  
As a research tool, methodology entails the description and evaluation of the methods, 
techniques and procedures used in the investigation of a research objective; it deals with the 
aims of the study and also attempts to justify the reason(s) for its usage. There are two types 




      
be classified as primary or secondary (Barbie, 2008:.351; Neuman, 2011:254). This study, 
having taken cognizance of the complex and immeasurable nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation (foreign policy), will employ a qualitative research methodology (Liebscher, 
1998:669). 
 
The analysis of the data will be premised largely on a content analysis approach using 
secondary sources and methods of data collection. This methodology was arrived at based on 
the relative accessibility of past literature and an avenue to build on what has previously been 
done. Shank (2002:6) observes that the content analysis approach has the following 
advantages: it allows for relatively easy access to data and also provides the researcher with 
the prerogative of deciding what to use, how to use it and where to use it. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the origin of the information may be questionable, and the doubts often associated 
with the validity and reliability of the data gathered could serve as impediments to the 
approach. To overcome this phenomenon, the researcher will critically evaluate the data 
gathered with a view to avoiding a misrepresentation of facts.  
 
In line with the above, and for the purposes of this study, Liberia has been chosen as case 
study. This choice is informed by the huge responsibility assumed by Nigeria under the 
auspices of ECOWAS throughout the crisis period in Liberia (1990-1997). Two other 
countries, Sierra-Leone, where Nigeria was active and Sudan, where it remains actively 
involved, were not adopted because Liberia offers the researcher the opportunity to undertake 
a review of Nigeria‟s interventionist role in Africa from an individualistic point of view. 
Added to this is the fact that Nigeria‟s role in Liberia is more distinctly defined, unlike in 
Sierra-Leone where the country was involved in a tussle with Ghana at some point over the 
leadership of the peacekeeping force and in Sudan, where Nigeria is presently engaged as a 
non-state actor. 
 
In view of the above, the investigation of Nigeria‟s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, 
with an emphasis on its role in the resolution of the Liberian civil war from 1990 to 1997 will 
be carried out using the content analysis approach. Content analysis, according to Patton 
(2002:452), implies, “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort which evaluates 
a volume of qualitative material and attempts to justify their core consistencies and 




      
the motivating and underlying factors surrounding Nigeria‟s interventionist mission in 
Liberia. 
 
This approach will also afford the researcher an opportunity to examine the alignment 
between such interventions and the core issues encapsulated in Nigeria‟s hitherto Africa-
centered foreign policy. Finally, the approach will provide the researcher with a detailed 
understanding of the motivations behind the purported shift in Nigeria‟s Afro-centric external 
policy to citizen diplomacy. This will be achieved through a survey of relevant academic 
books, journals, seminars, articles, government gazettes, and documentaries. 
 
The following chapter will focus on a review of relevant literature on the notion of conflict 
resolution and Nigeria‟s foreign policy. This is intended to provide more insight into the 





















      
CHAPTER TWO 
A Review of Literature on the Notion of Conflict Resolution and Nigeria’s 
Foreign Policy 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Given the seeming absence of effective conflict management mechanisms to manage Africa‟s 
myriad protracted conflicts, it is important to review the concept of conflict and the 
mechanisms involved in its resolution. A proper understanding of the nature of a conflict 
remains an indispensable necessity for its effective management.  
The majority of conflicts that have occurred on the African continent have been triggered by 
a number of issues. These range from agitations for resource control (such as the struggle for 
control over crude oil and gas, and other solid minerals) to politically motivated conflicts, as 
was the case during the Chadian, Liberian, Ivorian and the Sierra Leonean wars. In the past, 
Africa has also witnessed conflicts whose causes are attributable to the quests for self-
determination, leading to a number of secessionist or separatist wars, as seen during the 
Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the ongoing war of independence between Sudan and 
South-Sudan and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Obiekwe, 2009:1). 
 
This implies that when a citizenry is deprived of basic rights, either through some form of 
injustice or the uneven distribution of available resources by the state or its leadership, the 
possibility of resistance in the form of either civil disobedience or a total breakdown of law 
and order becomes inevitable. More often than not, this deprivation is usually manifested in 
the lack of quality education, the absence of social security, the unavailability of basic 
societal amenities and high levels of unemployment. In such situations, the worst hit are the 
able bodied youths; because they represent the bulk of the steady source of recruits for 
forceful revolt as witnessed during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars. 
 
It is also important to note, that these multifaceted goals pose a great challenge to the 
resolution and managements of conflicts in Africa, including the diverse perspectives of 
member nations and other multilateral organizations seeking to either resolve or manage 




      
review of extant literature and terminological clarifications related to the concepts of conflict 
and conflict resolution, including its variants, forms and universality. The relevant literature 
related to the concepts of diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, foreign policy and Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy will also be examined. 
 
2.2 Defining Conflict 
Before engaging in a discourse on the notion of conflict resolution, it is important to define 
the concept of conflict itself; this research study borrows the definitions offered by Coser 
(1956), Fink (1968) and Galtung (1992). In Coser‟s (1956:8) opinion, a conflict may be said 
to mean "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources or a struggle 
in which the aims of the opponent are to neutralize, injure or eliminate its rivals”. Fink 
(1968:456) perceives conflict to mean “the existence of non-compatibility or disagreements 
between two actors (individuals, groups, organizations or nations) in their interaction over 
issues of interests, values, beliefs, emotions, goals, space, positions and scarce resources”. 
 
According to Deutsch, (1973:10), a “conflict exists wherever incompatible activities occur”. 
Similarly, Himes (1980:14) perceives the phenomenon as “the purposeful struggle between 
collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, 
control, resources and other scarce values". For Pruitt and Rubin (1986:14), a conflict occurs 
when there is a “perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current 
aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously". Rhoodie (1991:21) argues that a "conflict 
usually occurs where a group or several groups of people compete for scarce resources."  
 
In Galtung‟s (1992:54) view, “a conflict situation takes place when there are instances of 
incompatibility among two or more parties, thus leading to one goal standing in the way of 
the other”. Galtung (1992:55) further explains that a conflict may take the form of the “less 
crystallized and the crystallized”. He notes that when “a conflict is in the less crystallized 
form; it is seen as an incompatibility between the objective interests of parties in a society, 
and when in the crystallized form, conflict represents an incompatibility between the 
subjective goals of action in a society” (Galtung, 1992:55). 
 
Typology wise, scholars such as Maslow (1943), Coser (1956), Fink (1968), Burton (1984), 




      
are pervasive in society, although the list cannot be said to be exhaustive. They include but 
are not limited to: Needs based conflict, which draws references from Abraham Maslow‟s 
hierarchy of needs. This theory holds the view that human beings have basic needs which they 
are driven to satisfy. These needs may be physical or psychological, and they could be quite 
complex to define. Prominent among these needs are the need for identity, security and 
control; the denial of these needs can lead to deep-rooted conflict if not well managed 
(Maslow, 1943).   
 
Value based conflict essentially concerns issues arising from differences of opinion and 
values. The values in this case may be religious, political, or ideological. Examples include a 
clash between the Capitalist and Socialist ideologies or a religious clash between Muslims and 
Christians. It is instructive to note that many of the unending social conflicts in the world are 
value based conflicts and they are usually difficult to manage, due to the adoption of a one 
zero-sum approach by the actors involved (Coser, 1956). The notion of Deep-rooted social 
conflict, on the other hand refers to conflicts between authorities, individuals and several 
competing groups within a society over scarce resources (Burton, 1984). 
 
An Interest based conflict arises from the insatiable material requirements of human beings 
and their limited supply. People compete for money, natural resources, jobs and social status. 
Most of the conflicts which occur among individuals and groups fall into this category 
(Galtung, 1992). Finally, Structural conflict, according to (Miller 2005), refers to a 
disagreement in socio-economic and political structures. Its distinguishing characteristic is 
that it pits human beings against one another in what can be likened to a zero sum 
association.3 
 
Arising from the explanations offered above, it can be argued that a conflict occurs in a 
society for various reasons, but more often than not, it is largely a function of the following: 
(1) competition for scarce resources among people, (2) the insatiability of human needs, (3) 
selfishness, ego and the desire to outwit others. Given the above, it is therefore necessary to 
                                                          
3 A zero-sum association is a variant of the Games theory and it is often used as a weapon of negotiation, war or 
for the settlement of disputes. Its central argument is premised on the assumption that the loss of one party is 
automatically the gain of the other, thus leading to fierce rivalry among the contending parties with the ultimate 
intention of outwitting one another. There are no holds barred in this type of warfare because of its 




      
provide an antidote capable of preventing such conflicting situations from arising in the first 
place. This antidote is usually referred to as the notion of conflict prevention.  
 
2.2.1 Conflict Prevention  
The term „conflict prevention‟ has been defined by Burton (1990:18) as “the process of 
dealing with the causes of conflict before it manifests including the removal of the causal 
conditions, to enable the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative 
relationships”. Miller (2005) also notes that the term is often referred to as preventive 
diplomacy or conflict prevention. Miller sees conflict prevention as including “any activity 
involving the maintenance of status quo due to potential threats associated with the crises or 
the anticipated outcomes from engaging in a dispute” (Miller, 2005:25).  
 
In more specific terms, conflict prevention is often associated with the concept of the Early 
Warning system. From an academic perspective, Austin (2004:2), views “Early Warning as 
any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of 
recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of whether 
they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both”.  He further refers to an Early Response 
as “any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict which 
aims at reducing, resolving or transforming the conflicting situation to a new peaceful order”. 
Dorn (2004:17) views Early Warning as “the act of alerting a recognized authority (such as 
the African Union) to a new (or potential) threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage”.  
 
As a follow up to the explanation offered by Dorn (2004), Adelman (2008) identified the 
essential concern of Early Warning as detecting rising tensions which could lead to violent 
conflicts and putting mechanisms in place that can stem rising tensions. He added, however, 
that the concept may not necessarily have the ability to prevent the tensions from arising at 
all. Adelman (2008) further observed that Early Warning not only includes the gathering of 
data, but its analysis in order to develop strategic options potent enough to provide an 
accompanying response when faced with a conflict situation. 
 
Building on the definition offered by Austin (2004), Woocher (2008: 3) similarly identifies 




      
magnitude and timing of the relative risks of emerging threats, (2) analyzing the nature of 
these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and, (3) communicating warning analyses to 
decision makers (Woocher, 2008: 3). From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the basic 
assumptions of the Early Warning Response System (EWRS) are deeply rooted in the belief 
that “international actors have a responsibility to act as „protectors‟ once the available 
information is processed in line with the rules and procedures that can prevent the occurrence 
of conflicts within an international or regional organization” (Barrs, 2006: 1).  
 
Given the above, it can be inferred that the essential concern of conflict prevention is to 
initiate effective conflict prevention efforts, solid enough to stand the test of time even in the 
face of egregiously violent circumstances. Such efforts may be constrained by issues such as 
geo-strategic concerns, security interests, cost-benefit analyses, and refugee issues. The 
combination of these constraints and their peculiarities has placed the responsibility of 
conflict prevention on the shoulders of state and non-state actors. Furthermore, Reimann 
(2004:1) notes that, “whenever this responsibility is assumed by either the nation-states (state 
actor) or international organizations (non-state actor) they must also endeavor to be neutral if 
any meaningful result is to be achieved” (Reimann, 2004:1). ). However, if the process of 
preventing conflict fails to produce the desired result; it may be necessary for the intervener 
to devise some other means of managing the conflict, an analysis of which is presented 
below. 
 
2.2.2 Conflict Management   
Scholars such as McGarry and O‟Leary (1993); Wallenstein (2002); Fisher et al. (2002); 
Miall, (2004) and Hamad, Ahmad and Azem (2005) have argued that the idea of conflict 
management basically involves two schools of thought: the Negativists and the Positivists. 
They noted that while the „negativists‟ are of the opinion that a conflict situation cannot be 
totally remedied, the „positivists‟ hold the belief that it is possible to eliminate conflicts. For 
this group (Positivists) conflict management is seen as a stage in the handling of conflicts, 
which could be followed by later stages. However, as Burton (1984:183) observed, a conflict 
could only be seen as “settled if the outcome entails a loss for one side and a gain for the 
other, or a compromise in which all or some of the parties are losers to some degree”, while a 




      
„transparent‟, „fair‟ and „unbiased manner‟, particularly by an independent party (Burton, 
1984:183). 
 
In their analysis of ethnic conflict regulation, McGarry and O‟Leary (1993:4) identified two 
primary concepts: conflict management and conflict termination. They noted that while the 
former concerns the handling of the consequences of differences between the conflicting 
parties, the latter emphasizes the processes that lead to its termination. A case in point is a 
situation where the parties involved in a conflict are obliged to share scarce resources in such 
a way that none is completely satisfied. In most cases, parties resort to coercion.
 
However, the 
conflict stands resolved if the outcome fully meets the needs and interests of all the parties 
concerned. This occurs where the „parties‟ agree to exploit and share resources in a way that 
completely satisfies everyone‟s values and interests.  
 
The above scenario, according to Wallenstein (2002:53), emphasizes the containment 
function of conflict management. He further adds that:   
 
 Conflict management typically focuses on the armed aspects of conflict: bringing 
the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the conflict and, thus, containing it. 
…conflict resolution is more ambitious, as it expects the parties to face jointly 
their incompatibility and find a way to live with or dissolve it (Wallenstein, 
2002:53). 
 
This implies that conflict studies views “conflict management as being on the same level as 
conflict settlement or containment. In other words, the general view of conflict management 
is that it is less advanced and it covers a narrower range of treatment of conflict in 
comparison with other more ambitious or advanced methods of dealing with the 
problem”(Wallenstein, 2002:53). This perhaps underpinned Fisher et al.‟s (2002:7) 
observation that, “while there are no claims of a universally accepted typology for the 
methods used in addressing conflict, there are still some consistent terms, seen as steps in a 
process and each step taken includes the previous one”. The authors classify these steps as 
conflict prevention, conflict settlement, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation and submit that conflict management is intended to limit and avoid future 





      
In line with the above interpretations, Miall (2004) argued that due to the largely ineradicable 
consequence of the differences in values and interests within and between communities in a 
conflict situation, the conflict resolution process essentially becomes unrealistic. Therefore, 
the best that can be done is to manage and contain conflicts and to occasionally reach a 
historic compromise which allows for the setting aside of violence for normal negotiations to 
resume. Hamad, Ahmad and Azem (2005) also observed that conflict resolution and 
transformation are phases in the treatment of a conflict, and are often more advanced than 
conflict management. According to them, conflict transformation refers to the process of 
addressing the wider social and political sources of a conflict while also seeking to transform 
the negative energy of war into positive social and political change (Hamad, Ahmad and 
Azem, 2005).   
 
If the process of managing the conflict espoused above fails to yield the expected result, there 
may be a need for the introduction of a conflict resolution mechanism whose major intent is 
to resolve the differences created by the conflict. This mechanism is usually called conflict 
resolution.   
 
2.2.3 Conflict Resolution 
According to Golwa (2009:279), conflict resolution refers to “the limitation, mitigation and 
containment of violent conflicts through the use of both forcible (coercive) and non forcible 
(non-coercive) instruments to stop the recurrence of humanitarian emergency situations”. In 
the view of Snodderly (2011:17) the primary responsibility of conflict resolution is to address 
the fundamental causes of conflicts by finding common interests, and by abiding by its all-
embracing goals. These, according to him, include: “nurturing positive attitudes and 
generating trust through reconciliation initiatives, including the building or strengthening of 
the institutions and processes through which the parties can interact peacefully” (Snodderly, 
2011:17).  
 
In order to achieve the goals identified above, Miall (2004) further suggests the need to 
recognize the interests of the conflicting parties, including their needs, perspectives, and 




      
transformative, it must take cognizance of the identification of the underlying causes of the 
conflict and address them through solutions that will be mutually satisfactory, self-
perpetuating, and self-sustaining in the long run. On the practicability of conflict resolution 
serving as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, Miall (2004) suggests the use of 
cooperation, non-confrontation, non-competition, and positive-sum orientation as possible 
strategies when dealing with actors and gladiators involved in the conflict.  
 
Miall (2004:14) concludes by noting that “serious challenges are found when warring parties 
favor for various reasons, the continuation of a conflict over its resolution, in such instances, 
the role of an external mediator may be quite useful”. This is because the involvement of an 
external party could help to create a balance of power, in the enforcement of sanctions, and 
also in making incentives available where and when necessary. However, for this mediation 
to succeed, Miall (2004) argued for the need for the mediator to be neutral in the resolution or 
negotiation process. 
 
In situations where a conflict is not responding positively to a non-violent resolution process, 
there may be the need for the application of some subtle force. Such force and its subsequent 
application is what Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) refers to as peacekeeping; a concept which 
is the pillar on which Nigeria‟s interventionist mechanism in Africa rests. It follows therefore 
that in resolving conflicts, different kinds of mechanisms are involved and generally speaking, 
the concept of intervention is often seen as the practical aspect of conflict resolution. A wide 
range of issues and conditions must be satisfied before an intervention can take place. A 
synopsis of these is presented below.  
 
2.2.4 Intervention 
Murphy (1996:11) refers to the concept of intervention as including, “the threat or use of 
force across state borders; either by a state or group of states in order to end widespread and 
grave violations of the fundamental rights of its people and other nationals”. According to 
Rodt (2011:3), “the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
notes that an external intervention becomes inevitable when there are obvious tendencies of 




      
cleansing”. This has been a feature of a number of African conflicts in recent times, examples 
of which include the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and the Darfur genocide in 2005. 
  
Motivated by the desire to forestall or put an end to this occurrence in Africa, the leadership 
of the African Union4 (AU) has put mechanisms in place to deal with the quagmire. This is 
reflected in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), which empowers 
the AU to “intervene in a member state, pursuant to the decision of its assembly of heads of 
states and head of government. However, this intervention is only expected to be enforced in 
situations where „grave atrocities‟, such as, war crimes, genocide and crimes against, 
humanity are been committed against the citizens”. Following the ratification of this Act by 
its Council of Head of States and Government, the AU put the treaty to test in Burundi (2003), 
Sudan (2004) and Somalia (2007) (Mashudu, 2011:32 -53).  
 
As Rodt (2011:3) observed, the essential argument rooted in the concept of intervention is the 
challenge it poses to the realist notion of state security, particularly as it involves recognition 
of the responsibility to protect the civilian population (R2P)5, when a state fails in its 
obligation to exercise its sovereignty according to the wishes of its people. Thus according to 
Crocker (2007:33), the notion of non-intervention should be seen as a conditional right 
because it could be withdrawn from a state when it can no longer guarantee the security of its 
own people, as it happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (1992-1995) Kosovo, (1999), Sierra 
Leone (2002), and in Darfur in 2003.  
 
Crocker (2007:34) further identifies „proponents‟ and „opponents‟ as the two major 
viewpoints associated with the concept of intervention. The proponents view the assumption 
of the sanctity of sovereignty as a mere responsibility and not a right; due to the internally 
                                                          
4The African Union succeeded the Organization of African Unity in 2002 following the ratification of the Sirte 
Accord by its 53 (now 54 with South Sudan since 2011) member countries. It has as its chief objective the 
responsibility of promoting peace and stability in Africa while pursuing the socio-economic and political 
development of its member countries. The body‟s headquarters is located in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia and it 
recognizes the Council of Heads of States and Government as its highest decision making organ. 
 
5The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged as a concept following the work by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Its central goal is to end mass killings and other crimes 
against humanity; including genocide and also to ensure the protection of civilians, ideally by their own state. 
However, if the state lacks the will or the ability to fulfill this set of obligations, the international community can 
intervene and take over responsibility for the protection of civilians within that state‟s territory. The concept was 
adopted by the UNSCR in 2006 under UNSCR 1674 on the protection of civilians and the 2009 UN General 





      
derived characteristics of conflicts and their tendency to create a stalemate, external 
intervention becomes inevitable. Crocker notes that this in contrast to the opposing claims 
made by the critics of intervention. He noted the following as very crucial to the success or 
otherwise of any intervention: (1) the competence, capability and determination of the 
intervening forces, (2) the involvement of the affected people, and lastly, (3) the leadership 
ability of the elites within the conflict zones (Crocker 2007:35).  
 
The point to note from the explorations offered above is that, more often than not, any conflict 
which does not subscribe to a peaceful form of negotiation or what Crocker (2001) calls 
diplomatic intervention would have to be resolved through military intervention. Crocker 
(2001:231) had earlier distinguished between diplomatic intervention and military 
intervention when he observed that the former meant the use of persuasive tools to negotiate 
for peace among warring parties. This, he noted, can take several forms and when sustained, it 
becomes the central feature of a state‟s foreign policy towards a country. A case in point is the 
mediatory role assumed by the United States in the Middle East, which dates back to 1948. 
 
Similarly, Hoffman, (2001:273) commented on the idea of humanitarian intervention in his 
analyses of the traditional views of intervention and asserted that the justifications for 
intervening in domestic conflicts, fall into the category of the jus ad bellum6. He argued that 
issues such as the justness of defending human rights, the principles of national sovereignty 
and the selectivity and inconsistency in choosing who to attack are key considerations which 
determine the efficacy of any humanitarian intervention. Hoffman (2003:274) also noted that 
the concept of humanitarian intervention is not without its own shortcomings. He identified 
issues such as the type of rights to be protected, the lack of proper authority to intervene and 
the use of military force as some of these inadequacies. 
 
Betts (2001:286) noted that for any intervention to achieve its purpose, it must be seen to be 
both limited and impartial, because when an intervener takes sides in a conflict, this 
undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of the external involvement. He stressed that 
limited intervention is capable of ending a war if the intervener takes sides; when this 
happens, the balance of power may tilt towards the advantage of the „weak‟.  However, on the 
other hand, he noted that impartial intervention may end a conflict if the outsider takes 
                                                          
6
 Jus ad bellum, according to Hoffman refers to a theory whose central thesis is premised on having a just 




      
complete command of the situation, intimidates the local competitors and imposes a peace 
settlement (2001:286-288). 
 
Given the above, it suffices to say that no matter how humanitarian an effort seems, there is 
an underlying interest attached to it; central to this consideration is the place of foreign policy 
in intervention. In the contemporary international system, states intervene in conflicts for the 
singular reason of protecting their „interests‟ even when the issues at stake are not necessarily 
a direct affront on the sanctity of their national interest.  The latter point was evident in the 
enforcement of the UNSCR 1973 of 2011 on Libya, the consequences of which led to the 
ousting and eventual death of its leader, Col. Muammar Gadhafi. While the enforcement of 
the resolution may be targeted towards protecting the civilian population, could the same also 
be said of the unspoken reasons attached to the enforcement of the „No Fly Zone‟? 
 
If not, how then do we reconcile the nexus between the intervention and its relationship with 
the national interest of the key actors (the United States, Britain and France) who enforced the 
resolution? The probable answer to this questions may be anchored on the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect, but behind all this is the undeclared doctrine of necessity to protect 
either the economic or political interest (or both) of the intervening states. This further lends 
credence to the fact that crucial to the survival of any foreign policy is the protection of the 
national interest - a phenomenon which ultimately helps to shape national identity and goals.  
 
In view of the foregoing, this study situates Nigeria‟s interventionist role in the Liberian crisis 
within the context of the failure of the Liberian state under the leadership of Samuel Doe to 
guarantee the lives and properties of its people; hence the justification for the external 
intervention. It is also imperative to note that the specificity of reasons for intervention varies 
widely. It could be political, as in the case of Nigeria‟s commanding role in the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean civil wars; or economic, in terms of what the intervening state stands to gain 
(for instance the role of the Americans in Iraq and the interest of Russia and China in Syria at 
the moment (2012)) and it could also be historical, as demonstrated in the case of America‟s 
long standing support for the state of Israel and the French intervention in the civil war in 
Ivory Coast.   
 
In addition  this, is the foreign policy orientation of the intervening state as it was the case 




      
foreign policy; a phenomenon that has become the defining characteristic of its conflict 
resolution mechanisms in Africa. Flowing from the above explication, one can therefore 
situate Nigeria‟s intervention in the Liberian civil war under the auspices of ECOMOG as 
one which was guided by the principles of its four concentric circles whose major pillar is 
anchored on the need to maintain peace with its contiguous states in particular and Africa in 
general. It is however, imperative to note that after every successful intervention in a conflict 
situation, there is need to put some machinery in motion in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict and sustain the fragile peace. This process is often associated with the notion of 
peace building. 
 
2.2.5 Peace building  
In undertaking an assessment of the literature on peace building, this study draws references 
from the classification of peace offered by Galtung (1964). Galtung is often seen as a pioneer 
of peace studies. He offered a two stage categorization of the concept of peace: positive peace 
or preventive initiatives and negative peace (curative measures). The defining characteristics 
of positive peace according to Galtung, are structural integration, optimism, prevention, and 
encouraging peace by peaceful means, while negative peace  refers to the absence of violence, 
pessimism and the facilitation of peace through a relatively non- peaceful means (Galtung, 
1964). Modern academic discourses on peace studies and peace building are credited to 
Boutros-Ghali7 (1992), who argued that post-conflict peace-building is vital if a successful 
transition to normalcy is to be achieved in a post-war environment.  He views the idea of 
peace-building as a “course of action intended to identify and support structures” which are 
capable of strengthening and solidifying peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. 
 
Boutros-Ghali (1992) further noted that in the aftermath of an international war, post-conflict 
peace building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects capable of linking two or 
more countries in a mutually beneficially way. This in turn, can lead to a rapid socio-
                                                          
7 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, politician and diplomat hails from Egypt. He served as the secretary-general of the 
United Nations (UN) from January 1 1992 to December 31 1996. Boutros-Ghali is reputed to be an academic. 
He submitted An Agenda for Peace, a detailed suggestion on how the UN could respond to violent conflicts 
around the world. However, he was criticized for the UN's failure to act during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 
which officially left about one million people dead and was also unable to garner the support of the UN Security 
Council for a military intervention that could have ended the civil war in Angola. One of his major challenges 
while in office was the dilemma of how to deal with the crisis that resulted in the disintegration of the former 




      
economic development and also enhance the confidence of all concerned. Consequently, in 
the opinion of Boutros-Ghali (1992), peace building places emphasis on the need for a gradual 
but consistent transformation of a conflict situation to peace. These transformative efforts can 
be achieved through the use of preventive diplomacy; peace-making and peace building. 
According to Boutros-Ghali (1992:1), “preventive diplomacy refers to an action which seeks 
to prevent disputes from arising between parties, preventing existing disputes from escalating 
into conflicts and limiting the spread of the latter when they occur”. 
 
On the other hand, peace-making refers to any action aimed at establishing an accord or truce 
among the warring parties through negotiations or peaceful bargaining, while peacekeeping 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992). Similarly, Lederach (1997) conceptualized peace building as the long-term 
transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of 
peace, justice, truth and mercy. The key dimensions of this process are the changes in the 
personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict and this usually happens over a 
period of time. He also noted that peace building has been concerned with an appropriate 
time-frame, including concentrating on mid-term steps towards building a peace constituency, 
while at the same time embracing a vision of the desired future and an awareness of the 
prevalent crisis.  
 
Clements (2004) however, notes that peacebuilding may at times involve unmasking the 
powerful and balancing unequal relationships by solving a recurring problem. The central 
emphasis in peacebuilding according to him is “on justice and fairness rather than on political 
harmony and political order”. Similarly, Schirch (2008:8) views peacebuilding as “the process 
of restoring normal relations between people through the reconciliation of differences, the 
apology and forgiveness of past harm, the establishment of a cooperative relationship between 
groups, and the replacement of the adversarial or competitive relationship that used to exist” 
(Schirch, 2008:8). 
 
Schirch (2008) further identifies four main issues as the primary concern(s) of peacebuilding. 
These include: providing security, establishing the socio-economic foundations for peace, 
setting up the political framework for long-term peace, and generating reconciliation through 
the healing of the wounds of war and justice. The three main spheres of peacebuilding 




      
issues, formal negotiations and diplomacy; structural peacebuilding which concerns 
infrastructure such as; “building economic, military, social and cultural systems that support a 
culture of peace through activities such as voter education, disarming warring parties, police 
training, building schools, and good governance; and social peacebuilding; this encompasses 
building relationships which focuses on feelings, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and sustaining 
societal values through  the use of dialogue, community-building activities and training” 
(Schirch, 2008:5). 
 
Flowing from the above explications, it could be argued that Nigeria‟s role in peacebuilding 
in Africa has been anchored on the wings of promoting peace and harmony in Africa; this has 
been demonstrated in a number of interventions, including in Congo, Chad, Equatorial-
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Sudan, etc. It is also pertinent to note, that many of these 
mediations have been made possible by the dictates of Nigeria‟s Africa-centered foreign 
policy objectives. This takes the form of an Afro-centric policy which emphasizes the need to 
maintain peace among its contiguous states (Benin Republic, Cameroon, Niger and Chad), 
while also maintaining a broader Africa-centered foreign policy disposition. The combination 
of these factors has helped shape the direction or pattern which Nigeria‟s conflict resolution 
mechanisms in Africa have followed in the past five decades.  
 
In order to gain a proper understanding of the nexus or otherwise between Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy and its conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, it is necessary to undertake a brief 
review of the essential elements embedded in foreign policy articulation.  
 
2.3 Conceptualizing Foreign Policy  
In the words of Macridis (1962:2), foreign policy implies the process through which policy 
making institutions and official actors define their positions and that of their states vis-à-vis 
the outside world, usually over a period of time. For Handrieder (1967:971), foreign policy is 
a “coordinated strategy through which institutionally designated decision-makers manipulate 
the international environment in their bid to achieve certain national objectives”.  In similar 
vein, Crab (1972:2) offers a more comprehensive explanation of the concept by referring to 
“foreign policy as consisting of two elements; with the first bothering on the national 
objectives to be achieved while the second focuses on the means of achieving them”. 




      
objectives are the perennial subjects of statecraft, while its ingredients are the foreign policy 
of nations, whether great or small (Crab, 1972:2). 
 
Lenther (1974:3) sees foreign policy as representing the existing intersection between the 
domestic and international life of a country. In Reynolds‟ (1976) view, foreign policy 
represents a range of governmental actions in its relations with other bodies, acting on a stage 
for the purpose of advancing the national interest.  Similarly, Rosenau (1980:6) sees “foreign 
policy as an authoritative action which a government takes or is committed to take in order to 
preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or alter the undesirable 
aspect”. Rosenau (1980) further argues that the concept of foreign policy is more often than 
not a function of an adaptive behavior consisting of all attitudes and activities through which 
organized national societies seek to cope with and benefit from their external environment.  
Similarly, Lerch and Said (1979:3) conceptualized foreign policy as the “general principles 
by which a state governs its reaction to the international environment”.  
 
The point to note from the definitions offered above is the presentation of foreign policy from 
the perspective of nation-states, taking into cognizance their roles as state actors in their 
interactions with other states and also the notion of the external environment as the 
fundamental objective of state policy. However, as Fawole (2003) observes, other non-state 
and non-human factors are involved in foreign policy considerations. These include the 
international environment, domestic factors (such as the economy and the political 
configuration operational in a state at that point in time), and the leadership factor. Fawole‟s 
(2003) analysis appears to be in line with Modelski‟s (1967:6) conceptualization of foreign 
policy as a “system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other 
states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment”. 
 
Drawing inferences from these scholarly assessments, it is useful to conclude these 
definitional issues with Abegurin‟s (2003:5) concept of foreign policy as “the attempt by 
human beings to protect against, relate to, and adapt to that which is external while benefitting 
from it and using same for their constituents‟ advantage”. The external factor, according to 
Evans and Newnman (1998:180), is vital in explaining foreign policy behaviour because it 
comprises of all those characteristics of a particular state considered by any other state or 
community to represent that which is different or unfamiliar. He added that when the policy 




      
with a high degree of external factors, the external factors are likely to be considered a threat 
or a potential threat to the state.  While the constituents‟ advantage, according to Idang 
(1973:5), represents the protection of the national interest, the primary task of all framers of 
foreign policy is to articulate their country‟s national interests and to relate them to those of 
other nations within the international system.  
2.3.1 The Primacy of the National Interest 
According to Barnett (2005:263), the protection of the national interest is a key determinant of 
the foreign policy of any state. There are two schools of thought on the subject of national 
interest: the subjectivist and the objectivist. While the objectivists argue that “the best interest 
of a state is a matter of objective reality, the subjectivists contend that what constitutes the 
national interest of a state rests on the preferences of the leaders, their idiosyncrasies and their 
priorities. This latter view suggests that the concept of national interest differs from “one 
country to another” (Barnett, 2005:266). For example, Crab (1974) identifies the national 
interest of the United States of America as predicated on her collective national security - a 
term anchored on freedom, equality, democracy, the open market and fundamental human 
rights; that of Britain, according to Taylor (2000), is defined by its commitment to 
conservatism, equality and fundamental freedom. Lee (1997) notes that France‟s conception 
of its national interest implies a commitment to European economic integration and the 
wellbeing of its people, while according to Thomas (2000), that of Russia and China are 
governed by the sanctity of their economic sovereignty. 
 
South Africa, a leading hegemonic force in Southern Africa has as its national interest the 
protection of its national sovereignty, national prosperity and respect for the core values 
captured in its constitution (Naidoo, 2010:210). Egypt, a major force in North Africa, 
maintains a national interest anchored on its security in the Middle East and respect for its 
military and religious institutions (Boutros-Ghali, 1977). It is important to note  that the 
protection of the national interest is crucial to any foreign policy articulation. Krasner (1978) 
defines this encapsulates the general societal goals perceived over time with a consistent 
ranking of importance, thus serving as a guideline for the conducting of a country‟s foreign 





      
2.3.2 Understanding Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 
Following the attainment of independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria assumed the 
obligation of getting involved in a multiplicity of socio-political and economic issues that are 
inextricably tied to the African continent. Politically, the country championed a number of 
decolonization struggles in Africa, including support to several liberationist movements in 
Southern Africa. Notable among these are the African National Congress (ANC) in South 
Africa, the South-West Africa People‟s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, the Zimbabwe 
Africa National Union-Patriotic Front, (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for the Popular 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), among others.  
 
Nigeria has also been at the vanguard of other peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives 
in Africa. The combination these initiatives have earned the country the appellation of „big 
brother‟.8 The point to note however is that such interventionist policies have largely been a 
function of the country‟s foreign policy dictates which, according to Nigeria‟s first Prime 
Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa is premised on the underlying principles of total 
commitment to the promotion of African unity, decolonization and a just world order. 
 
Years after the articulation of the above foreign policy guidelines, they have continued to 
form the underlying and guiding principles of Nigeria external relations with the rest of the 
world. This Africa-centered ideology, which pre-supposes that Africa will remain the 
centerpiece of Nigeria‟s foreign policy considerations and will receive priority in its 
engagement with the rest of the world, has remained a constant in Nigeria‟s engagement with 
other countries in Africa. Scholars such as Aluko (1981), Akinyemi (1989), Abegunrin 
(2003), Fawole (2003) and Akinterinwa (2010) have argued that the decision by Nigeria to 
make Africa its focus was occasioned by a number of factors. These range from geo-political 
considerations, which see Nigeria as strategically located within the West African sub- 
region, to demographic explanations; the country is the most populous nation in Africa and 
the largest Black nation in the world, with a population of over 160 million people. In 
economic terms, Nigeria accounts for more than 51% of the West African Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), with its GDP estimated at more than $407.042B (NNBS, 2012). As a result, 
                                                          
8 The term „big brother‟ is popularly ascribed to Nigeria by the virtue of its proven track record in issues 
involving peacekeeping, peace building and conflict resolution in Africa, including its commitment to 




      
Nigeria possesses the wherewithal to intervene in conflicts to protect its economy and 
hegemony both within the sub-region and in Africa.  
 
By virtue of its many years of diplomatic commitment and external relations with Africa, 
Nigeria has undoubtedly contributed immensely to the growth and development of the 
continent since its attainment of formal independence in 1960. Some critics of Nigeria‟s 
Afro-centric foreign policy have questioned the rationale behind its decision to concentrate its 
influence in Africa, particularly when considered from the perspective of the socio-economic 
and political implications for its citizenry. To this end, a review of Nigeria‟s foreign policy is 
best considered in the context of what constitutes its national interest, its foreign policy 
objectives and the foreign policy orientation of its leaders from independence to date. In 
doing so, concrete efforts will be made to interrogate the nexus between these foreign policy 
variables and the factors that have influenced Nigeria‟s external behavior in the past five 
decades, including the reasons for the seeming shift from its hitherto Afro-centric posture to 
what the government prefers to call citizen diplomacy.  
2.3.3 Centripetal determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 
Broadly speaking, the general idea behind classifying foreign policy into centripetal and 
centrifugal notions is rooted in the belief that there are domestic and external issues involved 
in any country‟s foreign policy formulation. In the case of Nigeria, the centripetal factors 
involved in its foreign policy formulation are generally built around: the Notion of Four 
Concentric Circles of National Interest. According to Gambari (1989:21), at the heart of this 
notion is the assumption that Nigeria must in the course of its engagement with the 
international community, protect its own security, independence and prosperity; this will be 
achieved through the maintenance of the spirit of good neighborliness with its contiguous 
states - Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The second circle concerns Nigeria‟s relations 
with its West African neighbors; the third focuses on continental issues relating to peace, 
development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria‟s relations with 
organizations, institutions and states outside of Africa. This concept is fundamental to the 






      
2.3.4 The Centrifugal determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 
Aluko (1977:2) maintains that the following essential components comprise the centrifugal 
forces determining Nigeria‟s foreign policy: 
(1) Commitment to the maintenance of peace and good neighborliness  with  its   
immediate neighbors;  
(2) A general commitment to the African cause (the policy of Afro-centrism); and  
(3) A commitment to the principles of non-alignment.       
 
He adds that despite the changes that have occurred in Nigeria‟s foreign policy dictates over 
the years, these three elements have remained constant.  Aluko (1977), further argues that 
factors such as the colonial heritage and the legacy the country inherited from the British, the 
foreign policy machinery of government, the outcome of its civil war and other national and 
economic interests are key determinants that have helped shape the country‟s behavior 
towards its neighbors in Africa and indeed the rest of the world. 
In consonance with the factors listed above, Aluko (1977) broadly captures the following as 
the essential foreign policy focus of the Nigerian state: the sovereign equality of all African 
states; respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African 
state; an unwavering commitment to functional co-operation, African Unity and economic 
development; a general commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other African states; and the maintenance of a just economic world order (Aluko, 1977:2). 
It could be argued that Nigeria‟s compliance level with the second item on the above list 
(respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity) is debatable. The country has 
intervened in a number of conflicts in Africa, and in all cases, the Nigerian state has justified 
its actions in terms of the overriding compulsion and responsibility to protect its national 
interest, including the political stability of the West African sub-region. However, it is 
important to note, that the whole essence of intervention should not just be premised on the 
need to protect a country‟s national interest. It is also important for the intervening state to 
seek and obtain approval from the de jure government or a well-recognized supra-national 
institution (such as the UN, AU, and ECOWAS); if it fails to do so, it renders the intervention 
illegal. When intervention is enforced, this could be interpreted as an encroachment on the 




      
Ogwu (1986) also identifies political considerations, the Nigerian constitution, bureaucratic 
tendencies, economic variables, military interests, and idiosyncratic elements as the essential 
issues that have contributed to the shaping of Nigeria‟s foreign policy direction in the past. In 
interrogating Nigeria‟s external relations, particularly with the Western world, Ogwu (1986) 
noted that the ability of Nigeria to determine its productive forces and its very low reliance on 
foreign aid accounted for the robust state of its foreign policy between 1960 and 1980: 
  The improved state of Nigeria’s economy bestowed on it a leverage which it 
did not possess in the first decade of independence. More significantly, 
perhaps was the government’s ability to determine its own policies 
independent of external influences (Ogwu, 1986:2). 
This is in line with an earlier observation by Aluko (1980:1) who, while exploring the reason 
for Nigeria‟s foreign policy vibrancy between 1960 and 1980, stated:    
 The phenomenal growth of the economy largely as a result of the oil boom 
has strengthened Nigeria’s influence in Africa and indeed the rest of the 
world, such that neither of the superpowers (US or USSR) could make use of 
foreign aid as a political leverage on Nigeria… heavy American dependence 
on Nigeria’s oil means that Nigeria is free not only to criticize the United 
States but also to put pressure on her (Aluko, 1980:1). 
Both comments were made in response to the foreign policy articulation and vibrancy 
witnessed during the short but impressive reign of the Murtala/Obasanjo administration 
(1975-1979). This period saw the country calling the bluff of former United States‟ President 
Gerald Ford over its recognition of and support for the Jonas Savimbi led UNITA rebels 
against Nigeria and the OAU‟s preference for the nationalist aspirations of the MPLA, led by 
Augustine Neto. Nigeria also nationalized some British interests, including Barclays Bank, 
which became Union Bank and British Petroleum, whose name was changed to African 
Petroleum by the Obasanjo/ Sheu Yar‟ Adua regime in reaction to the now infamous 
toothless dog reference made regarding that particular government by iron lady Margret 
Thatcher, the then Prime minister of Britain (Adebajo, 2003: 22; Fawole, 2003: 41; Gambari, 
2008: 3; and Osuntokun, 2008: 2). 
Lending his voice to the discourse, Gambari (1986: 1-5) captured the major characteristics of 




      
centrism and the protection of the national interest,  although he averred that these are still 
largely unrepresented, poorly articulated and lacking in vigor and direction. Flowing from 
these assessments, this study also considers it necessary to establish exactly what the foreign 
policy objectives of Nigeria are. In whose interests were they formulated? And to what extent 
have they been effective?  Providing adequate answers to these questions requires an 
interrogation of the fundamental principles encapsulated in Nigeria‟s foreign policy. This is 
the task of the following sub-section.   
2.3.5 Fundamental Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 
 A first glimpse of the shape which Nigeria‟s foreign policy would take was provided by 
Nigeria‟s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the occasion of the country‟s 
admittance as a member of the United Nations. In his acceptance speech, Balewa declared:  
  It is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all the nations and 
to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organizations. 
Nigeria, by virtue of being the most populous country in West Africa has 
absolutely no territorial or expansionist ambitions. We are committed to 
uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Nigeria 
hopes to work with other African countries for the progress of Africa and to 
also assist in bringing all African countries to a state of independence 
(Balewa, 1960) cited in Aluko, 1977:2). 
While there may be no denial of Nigeria‟s commitment to a clearly Afro-centric foreign 
policy approach, it is important to point out that the direction, pattern and shape which the 
pursuance of this approach has taken in the past has been a function of the political 
orientation, leadership style and personal aspirations of the individual in power.  This is 
traceable to the foundation laid by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, who on assumption of 
office on October 1, 1960,  pronounced the following as the core principles of Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy: (1) Non-alignment with any of the then existing ideological and military 
power blocs, especially NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (2) respect for the legal equality, 
political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; (3) respect for the 
doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; (4) seeking membership of 




      
Nigeria; and (5) the recognition of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria‟s external relations 
(Fawole, 2003:42).   
 
Sir Tafawa Balewa‟s extrapolation of his government‟s foreign policy orientation is believed 
to have provided the underlying philosophy which informed Nigeria‟s adherence to its 
principle of Afro-centrism - a development which saw Nigeria‟s foreign policy orientation 
between 1966 and 1993 tilting towards a firm commitment to decolonization and the social 
and political and economic liberation of other colonized (occupied) African countries. 
According to Idang (1973:6-9), Ogunbadejo (1980:675), Abegunrin (2003:33-58) and Fawole 
(2003:52-81), the period between 1960 and 1993 represents the „golden era‟ of Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy because it marked the announcement of Nigeria as a key player in Africa by 
virtue of the successes recorded at that particular point in time.  
 
Similarly, and, according with section 19 of the 1960, 1979 and 1999 constitutions of Nigeria, 
the country derives its foreign policy objectives from two main sources, namely: the 
constitution and the actions of its leaders. The essential ingredients embedded in Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy, according to section 19 of the 1999 constitution, includes the following: 
 
(1) Commitment to the Principles of Non-alignment; 
(2) Respect for the Legal Equality, Political Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial 
Integrity of all States; 
(3) Respect for the Principles of Non-Interference in the Affairs of other States; 
(4) Seeking Membership of International Organizations as a means of promoting 
functional cooperation; and 
(5) Africa as the Center-piece of Nigeria‟s foreign policy. 
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the essential elements embedded in 
Nigeria‟s foreign policy, it is important to provide a concise explanation of each of the 
principles listed above.    
 
(1) Commitment to the Principles of Non-alignment 
This principle was informed by the bipolarity in world politics at the time of Nigeria‟s 
independence in 1960. As noted by Fawole (2003:42), the world was precariously bifurcated 




      
communism which was championed by the former Soviet Union (USSR). Mindful of this 
situation, and informed by the desire to protect its nascent independence, Nigeria opted to be 
non-partisan in the power play between the Western and the Eastern blocs. However, scholars 
and critics of Nigeria‟s foreign policy have argued that this principle was respected more in 
theory than in practice. As Fawole (2003:43) argued, “Even the government of Sir Balewa, 
the progenitor of the idea did little to respect it” Balewa, he added was “so rabidly pro-British 
and concomitantly pro-Western”. He cited Nigeria‟s signing of a bilateral Defense Pact with 
Britain (a very strong ally of the US) in 1960; this was intended to allow the British to 
establish a military base in Nigeria. The Defense Pact was later abrogated in 1962, following 
severe and sustained pressure from the parliamentary opposition and the overwhelming 
disapproval of Nigerians (Fawole, 2003:43). 
 
(2) Respect for the Legal Equality, Political Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial 
Integrity of all States 
Scholars such as Ogunbadejo (1966), Idang (1973) Aluko (1977 & 1980) and Fawole (2003) 
have interpreted this principle as the expression of Nigeria‟s willingness and readiness to 
conduct its external affairs with other states according to the civilized rules of interaction. By 
so doing, Nigeria appears to be affirming its belief that the UN remains the legitimate supra-
national authority that can guarantee a just world order and that abiding by the decisions 
reached by the UN is non-negotiable. Nigeria, according to Fawole (2003:44), believed that 
abiding by and adhering to the dictates of international law and civilized rules of behavior is 
vital to guarantee the security of newly independent and weak states in a world laden with 
intense competition between antagonistic superpowers. 
Another motivating factor was Nigeria‟s desire to assure its contiguous states (Benin, Chad, 
Niger and Cameroon) and all other states on the continent that the country would not at any 
point in time impose its authority on any of its neighbors in Africa. As Balewa put it:  
We shall never impose ourselves upon any other country and shall treat every 
African territory, big or small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is 
only on that basis that peace can be maintained in our continent (Balewa, 




      
Balewa‟s assurances to Nigeria‟s neighbors and the rest of Africa were intended to prevent 
any of these nations falling into the embrace of the then power blocs and more importantly, to 
protect its hard-won independence and that of its contemporaries from the overtures being 
made by Kwame Nkrumah, through his Pan African movement. Balewa argued that this idea 
would lead to a loss of sovereignty and as such would return Africa to the pre-colonial age. 
Fawole (2003: 42) quotes him as saying that, “Nigeria was big enough and does not need to 
join others and that if others wish to join forces with the country, their legal standing and 
positions would be made clear to them in such a union”. 
 
(3) Respect for the Principles of Non-Interference in the Affairs of other States 
The basic idea encapsulated in this principle is the expression by Nigeria of its readiness and 
desire not to interfere in any domestic dispute that could arise in other African countries. The 
key challenge in this commitment is the doctrine of the protection of the national interest, 
which often compels the country to intervene in order to ensure peace amongst and within its 
contiguous neighbors. When this happens, the justification for such intervention is couched in 
what Hoffman (2003); Miall (2004); Crocker (2007); and Peen Rodt (2011) call the 
„Responsibility to Protect‟ (R2P). This has led to Nigeria becoming involved in what 
ordinarily would have been a negation of its policy of non-interference, although such 
interventions have been largely executed in its capacity as a non-state actor. Examples include 
Nigeria‟s active role in the United Nations Peace Keeping Mission in the Congo in 1960, its 
support for a number of liberation movements in Southern Africa between 1970 and 1994, 
and its role in the resolution of the Liberian (1990-2003) and Sierra-Leonean civil wars 
(1998-2002), among others. 
 
(4) Seeking Membership of International Organizations as a means of promoting 
functional cooperation 
Nigeria‟s subscription to this principle, according to Fawole, (2000:45) and Gambari 
(2008:58), has been influenced by the overriding advantage which functional cooperation has 
over a subscription to an African political union which at that time could not guarantee a 
certain future for a newly independent country like Nigeria. Therefore, Nigeria hoped that its 




      
protection, particularly given the bipolarity that existed at that time. As a consequence of this 
principle, Nigeria has, over the past fifty-one years, demonstrated its support for international 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of Nations, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the AU, and ECOWAS, to name but a few. 
 
(5) Africa as the Center-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
Following Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa‟s announcement at the UN General Assembly of 
Nigeria‟s intention to make the African cause its top priority, the principle has over the years 
grown to become the cornerstone of Nigeria‟s foreign policy thrust. As noted by Fawole 
(2003:47), Nigeria‟s commitment to a radical Afro-centric policy in the 1970s was more of a 
product of the psychological belief in and concurrence with what Sir Nnamdi Azikwe called 
Nigeria‟s historic mission in Africa and its manifest destiny to rule and dominate the 
continent. Long before its independence and the economic/oil boom of the early 1970s which 
catapulted Nigeria to an enviable economic height in Africa, its people have always believed 
that the country was preordained to play an important and leading role in African affairs. It is 
instructive to note that this notion did not only germinate in the minds of Nigerians; it was 
also believed and validated by the membership of the international community who saw 
Nigeria as being capable of making a difference in the world on account of its vast potential 
(Fawole, 2003:47).  
Commenting on Nigeria‟s participation in the UN‟s peace keeping mission in the Congo in 
1960, barely one month after the country‟s independence Cowan (1962:124) noted that “the 
dispatch of Nigerian troops to the Congo, created a new public awareness at home for the 
country, and also placed the country on the world map as well as on the African political 
space”.  Cowan (1962) pointed out that given the size, military might and economic potential 
of Nigeria, the country was expected to play a leading and decisive role in Africa. The 
amalgam of this potential and the leadership aspirations of Nigeria‟s past and present leaders 
can be said to have helped sustain and guarantee the continuing pursuit of this cause. By 
virtue of this commitment, Nigeria has committed substantial resources to peacekeeping and 
conflict resolution in Africa.   





      
2.4 Reconsidering the Utility of Diplomacy  
 
Satow (1966:1) maintained that diplomacy refers to “the application of intelligence and tact 
to the conduct of official relations between the governments‟ of independent states”. 
McDermott (1973:37) defined diplomacy as “a science which permits its practitioners to say 
nothing and shelter behind mysterious nods of the head…, a science in which the most 
successful exponent is the person who can swim with his head in the streams of events he 
pretends to be conducting”. For Morgenthau (1948), diplomacy implies “the technique for 
accommodating conflicts of interest, and the promotion of national interest by peaceful 
means.” Morgenthau further captures the following as the basic expectations of diplomacy:  
 
(1) The ability to determine its objectives in the light of actual and potential power and 
make use of the power that best suits these objectives; 
(2) The ability to assess the objectives of other nations while taking into cognizance the 
actual and potential power available for the pursuit of these objectives;  
(3) The ability to determine the extent to which these objectives are compatible with each 
other; and  
(4) Finally, diplomacy must be sufficient to employ the means best suitable for the 
pursuit of its objectives (Morgenthau, 1948:529). 
 
He noted, however, that, if during its practice, diplomacy fails to meet any of these 
obligations, then the protection, advancement and success of a country‟s foreign policy 
objectives and world peace may be in jeopardy. In similar vein, Plischke (1977:41) refers to 
diplomacy “as the political process where states establish and nurture official relationships, 
directly and indirectly in the pursuance of their respective goals and interest including their 
substantive and procedural policies in the international environment.”  
 
The point to note from the above is that, if statesmen or diplomats were asked why they take 
particular actions in their dealings with certain international organizations, their response may 
very well be premised on the primacy and need to protect the national interest. This lends 
credence to the importance attached to the sanctity of the national interest in foreign policy 




      
responsibility of an effective diplomacy to provide the machinery and the personnel by which 
a state‟s foreign policy is to be executed.  
 
In the opinion of Mingst (2004), the underlying principle behind diplomacy is the attempt 
made by states to influence the behavior of others either through negotiation, specific action 
or by refraining from such. Mingst (2004) further argues that when diplomacy is used to 
project power, the other actor (state) reserves the right to either publicly or privately, express 
its unhappiness with a policy choice using the same diplomacy as its tool of expression. 
Mingst (2004) suggested that a better association may follow if the targeted action changes in 
a specific (positive) way. He was, however, quick to point out that negative consequences 
might follow if the other state‟s action continues to move in a specific direction (negative).  
 
Mingst (2004) notes that if both actors are unable to resolve their differences through the use 
of diplomacy, they may have to resort to a supra-national institution9 in order to seek a 
multilateral legitimization of their positions, by enlisting the support of other states on their 
side. This, according to Mingst (2004), could be achieved by giving the target state what it 
wants, which could take the form of diplomatic recognition or foreign aid in return for a 
desired action; should problems arise from the above relationship, the donor state reserves the 
right to reduce the foreign aid, withdraw its diplomats or completely severe diplomatic ties 
with such a state. This, for Mingst (2004), represents the inherent strength in the use of 
diplomacy.  
 
In the practice of contemporary international relations, it is expected that states must operate 
within an international environment where there are always competing values and interests. 
To this end, state actors in the international system usually gear their efforts towards the 
maximization of their socio-economic and political values in their bid to minimize the effects 
of these conflicting interests and maximize the chances of realizing their state‟s objectives. 
Diplomacy thus becomes the basic technique of state action or the primary instrument for the 
execution of its foreign policy and it functions as the main stratagem by which a state 
                                                          
9 Supra-nationalism according to Price (2004) is derived from a Latin expression which implies to „be above‟. It 
refers to the existence of an international institution established beyond national sovereignties and is joined by 
all the participating countries such that there is an expression of partnership and mutual help among them. More 
often than not, such an authority takes advantage of their partially joined national sovereignties for the 





      
communicates its desires into the decision-making mechanisms of other states. This could be 
executed through persuasion, modification and the adjustment of the state‟s position through 
the use of force or negotiation. 
 
Flowing from the above, it is can be inferred that the primary responsibility of diplomacy is 
that it functions and serves as a tool for the preservation and advancement of a country‟s 
national interests. Another important instrument often employed in diplomacy is the notion of 
collective bargaining. This process, according to Mingst (2004), refers to some form of direct 
or indirect communication conducted tacitly among the negotiating parties, with each party 
knowing that a move in one direction could lead to a response by the other party. This 
suggests that effective diplomacy remains an indispensable tool for a state‟s foreign policy 
execution. It is only when diplomacy fails, that war and the use of force could be used to 
defend a country‟s national interest.  
 
Robinson (cited in Rosenau, 1986:189) asserts that the “primary interest of all nations should 
be focused on its territorial integrity and security, and the protection of the lives and 
properties of the people in whose interest it represents”. Holsti (1992:83) similarly captured 
the collective objectives of a state as self-preservation, security, well-being, prestige, power, 
and the promotion and protection of its ruling ideology. However, in what appears to be a 
distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy, Childs (1984:64) posits that the foreign 
policy of a state is “the substance of a state‟s foreign relations, while diplomacy concerns 
itself with the process through which foreign policy is carried out”. He concludes by positing 
that, a country‟s foreign policy is usually a combination of efforts made by many different 
persons and government agencies; nevertheless, the final call is still made at the highest level, 
although subject to many different kinds of controls. 
 
In the case of Nigeria, its national interests, according to Ogunbadejo, (1980); Aluko (1981) 
Ogunbanbi (1986); Adebajo (2008) and Gambari (2008) include but are not limited to the 
following:  internal cohesion, national unity, the creation of a happy and egalitarian society, 
the creation of a state where career opportunities are open to talent, where there is 
employment for those who want to and are qualified to work and where traditional rights 
such as freedom of speech, religion, association, and, equality before the law are respected, 
including the defense of the fundamental rights of all peoples,  irrespective of race, color, sex, 




      
 
It can be argued that a country‟s interventionist role in conflicts is often predicated on its 
belief in, respect for and commitment to the sanctity of internal cohesion and national unity. 
Consequently, Nigeria‟s Africa-driven ideology that seeks to create a just, happy and 
egalitarian society is not limited to the country itself, but extends to its contiguous states and 
the African continent. This is considered to be the driving force behind its active participation 
in conflict resolution efforts and peace keeping missions in the Congo in 1960, Chad in 1980, 
and in Liberia and Sierra-Leone in 1990 and 1998 respectively.  
 
Based on the above analysis, could the purported shift in Nigeria‟s foreign policy focus from 
its hitherto traditional Afro-centric posture to citizen diplomacy represent a more aggressive 
protection of the country‟s national interest? This question is addressed in the following 
section. 
2.5 Conceptualizing Citizen Diplomacy 
 
This section provides a brief examination of the foreign policy focus which the Nigerian 
government under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007 
conceptualized as „citizen diplomacy‟. Although citizen diplomacy appears self-explanatory, 
this study will nevertheless analyze the meaning, form, and operationalization of the term as 
it pertains to Nigeria. Eze (2007:8) defines citizen diplomacy as being people oriented; the 
domestic and foreign policy objectives of Nigeria seek to promote the welfare and security of 
its citizens all over the world. The key difference between this approach and the Afro-centric 
approach, according to Eze (2007:8), is the prioritization of the overall interest of Nigeria and 
its people over any other sub-regional or continental considerations.  
 
Similarly, Mbachu (2007:9) views citizen diplomacy as a structured action that government 
takes in order to fast-track the foreign policy objectives of a state as set by policy makers. He 
noted that these policy objectives must take into cognizance the wellbeing and aspirations of 
the people in whose interests they were established. Mbachu (2007) further notes that the 
concept portrays quite significantly, a re-invigoration of Nigeria‟s foreign policy pursuit in 
such a way that its end product (bilateral or multilateral agreements) will be both 




      
realization that the progress, prosperity and survival of the nation must be the concern of 
every Nigerian at home and in the diaspora.  
 
In the opinion of Okocha and Nzeshi (2007:3), the central idea behind the notion of citizen 
diplomacy is the protection of the image, integrity and interests of Nigeria and its people, 
while also reacting against countries that are hostile to the Nigerian cause and that of its 
people, including those who brand Nigeria as corrupt. Lending credence to this assertion, 
Ogunsanwo (2007) advocated the need for Nigerians abroad to be at the heart of Nigeria‟s 
national interest; therefore the country‟s entire diplomatic machinery should be geared 
towards protecting them. He further pointed out that any diplomacy that does not take this 
into consideration will be running contrary to the basic tenets of the concept.  
 
Maduekwe (Minister for Foreign Affairs and the progenitor of citizen diplomacy in the 
Olusegun Obasanjo government) provided the following justification for the change in 
Nigeria‟s foreign policy from an Afro-centric approach to citizen diplomacy: 
 
 Our foreign policy has come of age and the age of innocence is over. We remain 
proud of our track record from Tafawa Balewa up till now. The country that is the 
largest black Nation in the world could not have done otherwise. A world where 
one in every six black men in the world is a Nigerian could not have done 
otherwise, or where one in every four Africans is a Nigerian could not have done 
otherwise. We should ask ourselves some hard question: to what extent has our 
foreign policy benefited Nigerians? To what extent has our foreign policy put food 
on our tables? In other words where is the citizen in our foreign policy? 
(Maduekwe, quoted in Ogunsanwo, 2007:2).  
 
Maduekwe argued that Nigeria carries an enormous burden which requires it to be the symbol 
of the success of the Black nation and that there could never be a Black story, “unless it is a 
Nigerian success story”. Thus citizen diplomacy according to Maduekwe, implies ensuring 
that Nigeria‟s foreign policy becomes the most powerful way to express who Nigeria and who 
its people are, although he was quick to add that embracing citizen diplomacy as an external 
policy approach should be seen as a branding and not necessarily a total change in the 
fundamental principles of Nigeria‟s foreign policy. Akinterinwa (2010), however, argued for 




      
use the policy to immediately address problems such as  the refusal to grant entry visas to 
Nigerians who have legitimate documentation and reasons for wanting to travel, the shabby 
treatment Nigerians at home and abroad are confronted with and the need to ensure that 
Nigerian business entrepreneurs benefit from the country‟s regional and sub-regional peace-
making and peace-building efforts, particularly as they relate to humanitarian aid that could 
be locally sourced.   
 
It is important to note that while the Olusegun Obasanjo government, through Maduekwe, 
documented the existence of citizen diplomacy as a concept it never went beyond that point. 
Rather, it seems to have been an attempt to show Nigerians that the government was serious 
about reforming the country‟s foreign policy orientation. Not much of substance could be 
said to have been achieved. Furthermore, the economic meltdown experienced by most 
countries around the world at that particular time stymied the proper implementation of the 
policy. Given his responsibility as a career diplomat, Maduekwe was expected to protect 
Nigeria‟s national interest; however, several observers of Nigeria‟s foreign policy process 
have argued that citizen diplomacy was very similar to the country‟s traditional Afro-centric 
orientation (See Adebajo, 2008; Gambari, 2008; and Osuntokun, 2008).  
 
Another major issue which probably militated against the success of this shift in foreign 
policy is the lack of policy continuity and inconsistency that has been the defining 
characteristic of successive governments in Nigeria. Yar‟ Adua, succeeded Obasanjo spent 
half of his three years in office battling ill health and legal suits/a legitimacy crisis that were 
triggered by the alleged fraudulent electoral process that brought him to power (Adebajo, 
2008:3). This was coupled with an increase in agitation spearheaded by militants from the 
Niger-Delta who took up arms against the state in an attempt to control the natural resources 
(oil) they claimed belonged to them.  
This left the Yar‟ Adua administration incapacitated and unable to continue with 
Maduekwe‟s citizen diplomacy project. Instead, the administration appeared to revert to a 
foreign policy docility that a common feature during the dying days of the Abacha regime, 
until Yar‟ Adua passed away on May 5, 2010 after a protracted illness. President Goodluck 
Jonathan, who was next in command to the late president, also failed to define the pattern 
which Nigeria‟s foreign policy would follow in the wake of the high level politicization of 




      
from the general election held in April, 2007, government indicated that the administration 
was set to resuscitate the economic diplomacy approach that emerged during the last years in 
office of the Babangida regime. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has conceptualized the notion of conflict resolution as well as concepts such as 
peace building, intervention, conflict management and prevention, etc. It also focused on the 
relationship between Nigeria‟s foreign policy and the underlying principles behind the 
country‟s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa. A brief analysis of each of the essential 
attributes embedded in Nigeria‟s foreign policy established that there appears to be a 
connection between these interventions and Nigeria‟s long held commitment to the African 
cause. It was noted that most of these interventions are a by-product of centripetal issues such 
as the disposition and orientation of the country‟s leaders at various point in time, Nigeria‟s 
vast population and its socio-economic and political resources affords it the luxury of 
embarking on such undertakings.  
The chapter also revealed that factors such as the politics of oil diplomacy and the power play 
or configuration amongst various actors at the international level were also significantly 
responsible for Nigeria‟s interventionist role in Africa.  The chapter ended with a discussion 
of the possible reasons for the shift in Nigeria‟s foreign policy focus from Afro-centrism to 
citizen diplomacy and observed that not much has really changed in terms of the way Nigeria 
has handled issues related to Africa. This is evident in a number of interventions the country 
has made in Africa, including its deployment of troops to Sudan under the auspices of the 
United Nations and more recently in 2012 (five years after the policy was expected to have 
commenced) to Mali under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States 
peace keeping force (ECOMOG). 
The next chapter will focus on Nigeria‟s interventionist role in the Liberian civil war from 
1990 to 1997. Aside from the widely publicized belief that the country was obliged to act in 
terms of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the chapter will investigate whether 





      
CHAPTER THREE 
Nigeria’s Interventionist Role in the Liberian Civil War: the Myths and Realities 
of Pax Nigeriana 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the ECOWAS10 led intervention in the Liberian Civil 
war, which eventually came to an end in 2003 following the signing of a comprehensive 
peace agreement which led to a general election. The focus of this chapter is the role played 
by Nigeria under the auspices of ECOMOG between 1990 and 1997, in order to determine 
the nexus or otherwise between the country‟s foreign policy objectives. This chapter provides 
background information on the historical evolution of the Liberian state, a synopsis of the 
causative factors of the war, the key actors involved in its prosecution, the international 
dimensions attached to the crises and post-war reconstruction efforts in Liberia. It concludes 
with suggestions on how to prevent such occurrences in the future. 
3.2 The Historical Evolution of the Liberian State  
The history of Liberia dates back to 1821, when the American Colonization Society began its 
campaign to send freed slaves from the United States to Africa; the country achieved formal 
independence in 1847. According to Hadden (2006:2-4), Liberia literally means the “Land of 
the Free”. It is approximately 43,000 squares miles in size, a few degrees north of the equator 
and lies along the great western bulge of the continent with a coastline approximately 370 
miles long. Liberia is divided into 15 counties which are in turn broken down into localities; 
these include: Bomi; Bong; Gbarpolu; Grand Bassa; Grand Cape Mount; Grand Gedeh; 
Grand Kru; Lofa; Margibi; Maryland; Montserrado; Nimba; River Cess; River Gee and Sinoe 
counties.  
 
Liberia‟s population was estimated at close to about four million people in 2011. Its 
immediate neighbors are Sierra-Leone to the west, Ivory-Coast to the east and Guinea to the 
                                                          
10 ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States was formed in May, 1975 for the purpose of 
fostering sub-regional economic development among its 16 member countries in West Africa. Its membership 
strength dropped to 15 after Mauritania withdrew its membership in the 2000. The organization‟s 
military/peacekeeping arm is known as ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group). It has successfully 






      
north. Its dominant ethnic groups are the Kpelle, Brassa, Gio, Mano, Kru, Lorma, Kissi and 
the Gola peoples (World Bank, 2011). Its first semblance of nationhood began in 1847, when 
freed slaves from the United States of America established the first Black-ruled republic in 
Africa. Out of their experience of slavery, Americo-Liberian group brought with them the 
ideals of freedom, and respect for the principles of human dignity; the country served as a 
„safe haven‟ for a number of Black Americans who had been victims of oppression (Hadden, 
2006). 
However, this new wave of “freedom and good governance” eventually lost its steam and 
was replaced by the domination ofan Americo-Liberian political elite11. In 1878 the Americo-
Liberians formed the True Whig Party which took charge of Liberia‟s socio-economic and 
political resources between 1847 and 1980. The party subsequently became known for its 
zero tolerance of any organized political opposition; this resulted in a series of unrelenting 
uprisings, rebellion and unrests on the part of Natives. The Americo-Liberians controlled key 
economic resources. They had a higher level of technical and educational skills and enjoyed 
mutually beneficial relationships with a number of American institutions, including the 
American government. This led to social stratification and the creation of a cultural and racial 
caste system in Liberia12 (Adebajo, 2002: 22). 
The Americo-Liberians were able to maintain their grip on power courtesy of the unwavering 
support they received from the United States. This continued until 1980, when the uprising 
led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe13 brought their dominance to an abrupt end. Adebajo 
(2002:23) notes that for more than a decade, Liberia was the theatre of one of the deadliest 
wars in Africa with well over 200,000 Liberians killed and more than a million others 
displaced. The attacks, he noted, were reportedly launched from neighbouring Cote d‟Ivoire 
                                                          
11
 American-Liberia elite domination refers to a system of oppression and abuse which transformed Liberia into 
an ineffective and corrupt system that had become the defining characteristics of many states in post-colonial 
Africa. 
 
12 A pyramidal societal structure refers to the entrenchment of a system in Liberia, which encouraged and 
supported the socio-politico- and economic domination of the Americo-Liberians over the local people, thus 




13 Master Sergeant Samuel Kayon Doe was the President of Liberia between 1980 and 1990; with the support of 
the White House, he was reputed to have ruled Liberia with an iron fist, earning himself a place in the class of 
the late Idi-Amin of Uganda and the self-proclaimed Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. He was overthrown, arrested 




      
by a small group of dissidents, trained and armed by Libya with the assistance of Burkina 
Faso. This left the country with painful memories of destruction, unprecedented, protracted 
violence, killings and an unparalleled level of state incapacitation, (Adebajo, 2002:23). 
3.3 The Samuel Doe Era in Liberia 
Like most African states, Liberia is a multi-ethnic and multi-plural society. It comprises 
mainly of two large ethnic configurations; the Americo-Liberians and the Natives; the former 
dominated the country‟s political space from independence in 1847 until 1980 when Master 
Sergeant Samuel Kayon Doe overthrew the administration of President William Tolbert in a 
military coup. According to Osaghae (1996:10), amongst the reasons for this coup were:  
(1) The  fact that the Americo-Liberians constitute only about 3% of the country‟s 
(1.5 million people in 1980) entire population but have been at the helm of 
affairs since independence in 1847; 
(2) The Americo-Liberians have been in control of the socio-economic and 
political structures in Liberia since independence; this negated the principles of 
true independence the country stood for; and 
(3) Regardless of the fact that Liberia gained independence in 1847, the country 
remained largely dominated by outsiders, thus leading to what the natives 
perceived as marginalization until the revolt against the government of 
President William Tolbert, (himself an Americo-Liberian) by Samuel Doe 
(Osaghae, 1996:10). 
Doe remained in office until 1990; his arbitrariness and despotic tendencies saw him 
transform himself to a civilian president, in a manner that has been described by Ajayi 
(1998:182) as lacking in transparency and integrity. As Ajayi (1998:182) noted “Doe ruled 
Liberia with an iron fist and the situation became so tense and unbearable for Liberians until 
it eventually culminated into a civil war”. This marked a turning point in Liberia‟s history 
and the commencement of a fratricidal war described by Nwolise (1992:58) as filled; “with 
untold hardship, and gross indiscipline amongst the Armed forces of Liberia and on the part 
of the rebel troops who subsequently got involved in the indiscriminate kidnap of foreign 
citizens” (Nwolise, 1992:58). 
Similarly, Adebajo (2002:19) identified the following as the causes of the Liberian civil war: 




      
(2) The brutal and inept rule of Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe; 
(3) The deleterious effect that Doe's misrule had on the Armed Forces of Liberia; 
the ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from this rule;  
(4) The sub-regional tensions and rivalries that resulted from Doe's bloody rise to 
power; and  
(5) The destabilizing effect of the sudden withdrawal of US support for Doe, who 
until then had been a strategic Cold War ally (Adebajo, 2002:19). 
 
Adebajo (2002) listed the six main actors involved in the war: the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL); the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL); the NPFL-Central 
Revolutionary Council (CRC); the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO); and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) 
(Adebajo, 2002:20). It is however instructive to note, that despite the several attempts made 
by ECOMOG to ensure the containment of the war within Liberia, it nevertheless had a spill-
over effect on its neighbouring countries. Consequently, dozens of foreigners were killed in 
the crises; with countries like Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria witnessing a large influx of 
refugees (Adebajo, 2008:178).  
After a series of peace accords, including the election of a former warlord (Charles Taylor) as 
president, together with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in 2003 the 
Liberian government and rebel groups put a framework in place for peace building and post-
conflict reconstruction. This was consolidated with a successful transition towards 
democratization, which in November 2005 resulted in a general election that brought Africa‟s 
first female president to office; a development described by Eso (2003:11) as an exceptional 
phenomenon in a predominantly male-dominated political environment. 
An understanding of the reasons for Nigeria‟s involvement in the Liberian crisis is necessary 
to facilitate a proper understanding of the basis for its intervention and its nexus with 
Nigeria‟s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa.  
3.4 Nigeria in Liberia: Between Personal and National Interests 
Nigeria‟s affinity with Liberia dates backs to the events leading to the formation of the now 




      
members of the Monrovia group14. It was therefore not surprising that the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria became involved in the Liberian crisis at its onset in the early 1990s through the 
ECOMOG. Historically, Nigeria‟s involvement in the crisis has its root in the 13th session of 
the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government held from 28 to 30 May, 1990 at 
the Gambia. According to Ajayi (1998:183-184), President Babangida of Nigeria canvassed 
for a community standing mediation committee to intervene in the Liberian dispute, with 
Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea as members.  
As Ajayi (1998) observed, the ECOWAS cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) drew its 
military contingent from the member countries of the mediation committee and was 
subsequently mandated to restore peace to war-torn Liberia. Courtesy of its hegemonic status, 
geographic location, economic strength and military capabilities, Nigeria assumed command 
of the operation and also contributed about 80% of the of the ECOMOG force in terms of 
logistics, manpower and financing. For a better understanding of Nigeria‟s role in Liberia, it 
is necessary to examine the interventionist role played by ECOMOG in the crisis.  
This is necessary because Nigeria was the only contributing member whose exit from the 
operation would likely have meant the end of that mission, for the following reasons: 
(1) Most of the financial costs of that operation were borne by the Nigerian 
government, firstly under the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida and 
later under that of General Sani Abacha. It was estimated that Nigeria committed 
a total amount of $4 billion.       
 
(2) Nigeria had the largest number of troops in the 3,600 strong contingents that 
were deployed for that mission; although Nigeria had the capacity to intervene 
alone in the conflict, it involved other ECOWAS countries in a bid to still public 




                                                          
14The Monrovia group was a rather conservative ideological movement whose merger with the Casablanca and 
Libreville group later led to the emergence of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963. On July 9, 
2002 the OAU changed its name to the African Union following the ratification of the name change by its 




      
The Contending Arguments for Nigeria’s Involvement in Liberia 
This research study examines the reasons for Nigeria‟s involvement in Liberia from two 
relatively different viewpoints and seeks to establish a balance between them. The first school 
of thought, as captured by Adebajo (2008:185), includes scholars such as: Mays (1994:114), 
Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1994:273), Adeleke (1995:577-599), Reno (1995:115), Sesay (1996:67), 
Tarr (1998:115), Walraven (1999:11) and Ellis (1999:5). The following is a summary of their 
arguments as to why Nigeria intervened:  
(1) The close connection existing between Nigeria‟s Head of State, Gen. 
Babangida and his Liberian counterpart, Samuel Doe; 
(2) The holding of Nigerians hostages by the NPFL; 
(3) Nigeria‟s rumored concern over the perceived ambition of the Libyan 
government under Muammar Gadhafi to establish an anti-Nigerian alliance in 
concert with Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast in Liberia; and 
(4) Nigeria‟s longstanding suspicion of the French government‟s politico-
economic ambition to orchestrate an anti-ECOMOG alliance in West Africa. 
 
Each of the reasons cited above are examined in order to establish their veracity or otherwise. 
The counter arguments provided by Adebajo (2008) against each of the claims are also 
outlined. 
The Babangida/Doe Connection 
The authors argued that understanding the relationship between General Ibrahim Babangida 
and Samuel Doe is crucial to understanding the reasons behind Nigeria committing such huge 
resources to restoring peace to Liberia. An undefined, special relationship between Nigeria‟s 
Ibrahim Babangida and Liberia‟s Samuel Doe is assumed to have existed. This is premised 
on the significant investments the Babangida regime made in Liberia during this period. 
It was noted that “Babangida had contributed about $1 million towards the establishment of 
the Ibrahim Babangida Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Liberia; 
sent a large cache of military supplies to Doe to quell the NPFL rebellion; both countries had 
just recently signed an Economic, Scientific and Technical Agreement in 1988”. Nigeria had 
also paid for the Liberian section of the Trans-African highway which the Liberian 




      
Development Bank (ADB) and invested another $25million in the joint Liberia-Guinea 
Mifergui iron project, (James, 1990:124; Aning, 1994:15; Sesay, 1996:67; Dunn, 1998:89; 
Tarr, 1998:115; Walraven, 1999:11; and Ellis, 1999:5).  
While agreeing that Babangida and Doe had a financial relationship, Adebajo (2008:185), 
expressed reservations about the „special relationship‟ believed to exist between them.  
Adebajo (2008:185) was of the opinion that the issue had been exaggerated. He noted that 
Babangida had always been very disdainful in his attitude towards Doe, who was a Master 
Sergeant but promoted himself to General without rising through the ranks; by the time the 
war began in 1990, he had become an embarrassment to himself and Babangida. Secondly 
and contrary to the widely held belief that Babangida and Doe were the best of friends, 
Adebajo (2008:185) argued that Benin, Togo and Niger enjoyed more economic and political 
ties with Nigeria than Liberia. This,  he argued was further buttressed by Babangida‟s 
decision to get Doe to resign (which he never did) despite having supplied him with some 
weapons at the beginning of the crises. This, he noted, was crucial to the success of the 
Nigerian-led ECOMOG mission.   
Adebajo (2008:185) further contended that Doe‟s rejection of the peace plan offered by 
ECOMOG when he learnt that it called for his resignation (with Babangida fingered as the 
brain behind the plan) and the fact that Doe was murdered shortly after the ECOMOG forces 
entered Liberia and the subsequent granting of asylum to Prince Yommie Johnson all point to 
the fact that Nigeria‟s interventionist role in Liberia was not directly targeted at saving 
Samuel Doe.. 
On the Hostage taken of Nigerians in Liberia  
Another reason that was advanced by this group of scholars for Nigeria‟s  intervention in 
Liberia was that about 3,000 Nigerians were reported to have been held hostage on account of 
the on-going war in Liberia. By August 1990, the NPFL forces had launched attacks on 
Nigerians (mostly embassy staff and lecturers at the University of Monrovia). Although the 
Babangida regime eventually evacuated the Nigerians, some casualties had already been 
recorded. Thus calls into question how well the administration protected Nigeria‟s national 
interest in Liberia when countries like the United States and other European countries not 
only evacuated their citizens but also making use of their security apparatus to protect their 




      
Adebajo (2008:187) agreed that Nigeria‟s intervention in Liberia was partly premised on the 
need to free Nigerians held hostage by the NPFL; but he argued further that this could not 
have been solely responsible for Nigeria‟s intervention in Liberia. He noted that the 
ECOMOG intervening force under the leadership of Nigeria spent about seven years in 
Liberia; this buttresses the argument that the intervention was a sincere commitment to peace 
rather than an attempt to support Nigeria‟s hegemonic aspirations. 
On the Perceived Anti-Nigerian Alliance in Liberia 
Mays (1994:114), Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1994:272), Adeleke (1995:577-599) and Ellis (1999) 
suggest that Nigeria‟s interventionist role in Liberia was an attempt to foil the renewed efforts 
by Libya‟s Muammar Gadhafi to annex of Burkina Faso, thus removing it from Nigeria‟s 
reach. According to Adebajo (2008:186), this was later proven to be not the case; Libyan 
expansionism in Liberia was not a particular foreign policy interest to Nigeria; rather the 
desire to stay committed to the country‟s long held principle of its „four concentric circles‟ 
mattered most to the country at that point in time, hence its commitment of significant 
resources for the resolution of the crises through the ECOMOG.  
On Nigeria’s Perceived Growing Influence of the French in Liberia 
Contrary to the widely held belief advanced by Tarr (1998:115) that Nigeria became involved 
in Liberia to check the growing influence of the French in that country, Adebajo (2008:186) 
argued that regardless of the fact that the French business community benefitted through 
some of their dealings in the NPFL‟s controlled territory, the French authorities as an 
institution, showed little or no interest to events in Liberia, which in any case was 
Anglophone due to colonial antecedents. Instead, what happened was that some private 
French concerns were involved in several „shady‟ business transactions with the Charles 
Taylor-led NPFL.  
Adebajo (2008:186) further notes that the argument raised by this school of thought has failed 
to differentiate between private French interests in the NPFL-controlled areas and the official 
position the French government adopted through its foreign policy. Adebajo (2008) noted 
that, not only did the French decline to give military support to the pro-NPFL camp but the 
country also availed the ECOMOG of some tacit military support through the UN Trust Fund 




      
ostensibly to build the improved political relationship that had blossomed at a time when the 
war had already begun.    
Against the backdrop of the analysis presented by both schools of thought, this study 
concludes that there are three alternative explanations for Nigeria‟s intervention in Liberia; 
these are presented below. The below explanations are drawn from the seeming correlation 
between the arguments presented by scholars and records from that particular point in time.   
3.5 Three Alternative Explanation(s) for Nigeria’s Involvement in Liberia  
According to the views expressed by Kupolati (1990); Fawole (2008), and Adebajo (2008) 
the following constitute the “three alternative explanations” for Nigeria‟s decision to 
intervene in Liberia through ECOMOG: 
(1) Following the new world order that emerged during and after the Cold War, 
the possibility of Nigeria flexing its muscles in Africa was enhanced as 
neither of the two main ideological blocs (east and west) showed renewed 
interest in Africa after the war ended in 1989. Consequently, it became 
practicable for Nigeria to command and exert its authority in West Africa; a 
phenomenon which has been popularly associated with its idea of Pax 
Nigeriana.15  
(2) Another possible explanation for Nigeria‟s interventionist role in Liberia was 
General Babangida‟s desire to create an image of himself as „a fearless, brave 
and great leader‟ whose memory he had hoped would remain indelible in 
Nigeria‟s contemporary history; and 
(3) The aspirations of the Nigerian Army to show the West African sub-region, 
Africa and indeed the rest of the world that it had the necessary resources and 
capabilities to maintain peace within its own constituency (West Africa) 
(Adebajo, 2008: 87). 
 
It could thus be inferred from the above that Nigeria‟s involvement in Liberia was anchored 
on the desire by the Babangida administration, through the use of the Nigerian Army, to 
                                                          
15The idea of Pax-Nigeriana according to Adebajo (2008:12) was first mooted in 1970 by Professor Bolaji 
Akinyemi, Nigeria‟s Foreign Affairs Minister between 1985 and 1987. It is a foreign policy term which 
connotes Nigeria‟s leadership role in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, but broadly 
speaking, it represents Nigeria‟s desire to play a leading politico-economic and military role in Africa, in the 





      
prove that the country under his leadership possessed everything it takes be a peacemaker. 
This suggests that leadership aspirations were a centrifugal determinant of Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy. General Babangida saw Liberia as the most suitable platform to showcase his 
charismatic traits and morale and also to boost his ego.  
A graphic illustration of Babangida‟s drive for power and recognition as a statesman was 
made by Soyinka (1996:14): 
Babangida’s love for power was visualized in actual terms to mean: power 
over Nigeria, over the nation’s impressive size, its potential, over the nation’s 
powerful status and within the committee of nations. The potency of Nigeria 
was an augmentation of his own sense of power (Soyinka 1996:14). 
Alluding to the amount of power and influence wielded by Babangida between 1985 and 
1993, Othman (1989:142-143) observed that “no other Nigerian leader had established such a 
firmer grip over the military hierarchy and the country than the way Babangida did”. 
Babangida, he said, relished his personal contribution to Nigeria‟s contemporary history, 
together with the way he exerted his influence and personal authority on matters of state and 
those concerning Nigeria‟s relationship with Liberia.  
Adebajo (2008:188) further argues that Babangida‟s desire to demonstrate his leadership 
potential to West Africa and indeed the world, led to the use of Liberia as a centerpiece of his 
administration‟s foreign policy focus; a development which further exacerbated the already 
strained relationship between Nigeria and the Charles Taylor-led NPFL rebels. Consequently, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Babangida became an instrument in the hands of the 
presidency rather than an „engine room‟ for foreign policy articulation and propagation. 
Power was so concentrated in the Presidency that no one, not even the Ministries of Defense 
and Foreign Affairs could tell exactly how much Nigeria had spent on the ECOMOG mission 
in Liberia (Adebajo, 2008:188). 
Citing a final reason which influenced Nigeria‟s interventionist role in the Liberian crisis, 
Kupolati (1990:327) noted that the Nigerian Army has been extremely keen to demonstrate to 
the international community that it possesses the required professionalism, manpower and 
resources to maintain peace even outside the Nigerian territory. This was necessary to dispel 
insinuations that the Nigerian army was only proficient in coup making, particularly given the 




      
been largely inactive after the completion of its mission in Chad between 1980 and 1984, 
Liberia therefore offered the Nigerian military a suitable environment to demonstrate that it 
remained an effective peace keeper that could maintain peace as well as exert its authority 
within a sub-region it considers its primary constituency. 
This role was further informed by the successes recorded by the Nigerian military in its 
United Nations (UN) supervised international peace keeping efforts in the Congo, Balkans, 
Lebanon, Kuwait, Western Sahara, Somalia and Rwanda, and Sudan. Nigeria also saw Liberia 
as an opportunity to promote its pursuit of a permanent Security Council seat at the United 
Nations and as a platform to assert its status and authority as a regional power. Furthermore, 
as Omede (1995:51) notes,  “the Nigerian military made use of the Liberian civil war as a 
testing ground for both its effectiveness and the viability of its arsenals and to also act as a 
deterrent to any hypothetical enemy”; an aspiration that was made possible by the oil boom 
enjoyed by Nigeria in the 1970s (Omede, 1995:51). A combination of all these factors led to 
Nigeria‟s involvement in Liberia between 1990 and 1997, under the auspices of ECOMOG.  
By October 1999, ECOMOG had withdrawn its final contingent from a conflict which for 
most of its seven-year duration hardly touched on Western consciousness. The conflict was a 
manifestation of a post-cold-war intra-state conflict with all the attendant signs and defining 
characteristics of state failure; tribal conflict and political disintegration; and a rather overdue 
response from the UN. ECOMOG`s impact in Liberia was felt more in the area of 
peacekeeping, whose absence would have seen the conflict drag on unnecessarily, leading to 
the loss of more innocent lives to a feud occasioned by Charles Taylor and Samuel Doe‟s lust 
and desire for power.  
It is however, instructive to note that all this happened at a cost to the ECOMOG and, by 
extension, Nigeria. Charles Taylor had always nursed ill feelings towards Nigeria for the 
latter‟s role in denying him the „harvest‟ of his conquest which he felt was inevitable against 
Samuel Doe before the peace keeping force stepped in, in 1990. This led to the hostility, 
maltreatment and open confrontation faced by the remaining Nigeria-led ECOMOG troops 
that stayed back under the terms of the Abuja settlement, as well as the molestation of law-
abiding Nigerians resident in Liberia.   
It can thus be inferred that Nigeria‟s role in Liberia was fuelled primarily by the leadership 




      
army and in terms of the practical interpretation of Nigeria‟s theory of four concentric circles 
(particularly the notion of the need to maintain peace with its contiguous states and West 
Africa), the regime, as  Adebajo (2008:189) notes, assumed the responsibility of restoring 
peace to Liberia in spite of its huge cost implications. The Babangida administration 
estimated this cost at more than $4 billion, although it is believed that it might have been as 
high as $10 billion. It is important to note that this happened at a time when the country‟s 
debt profile was rising, when average Nigerians was barely living from hand to mouth, when 
electricity and other key social infrastructure were virtually non-existent and more 
importantly at a time when Nigeria had (and still has) not escaped the appellation of a  but 
„poor‟ nations (Adebajo, 2008:189). 
The following section examines the role played by other state and non-state actors in the 
Liberian impasse.   
3.6 The International Dimension to the Crisis 
 
The Role of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG  
The authority and control exercised by Charles Taylor‟s NPFL in the mid-1990s left the 
government of Samuel Doe with no other choice than to appeal to the Economic Community 
of West African States through the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) for 
support. By 1993, the mission had assumed a fully fledge peacekeeping role, which 
necessitated the initial deployment of an approximately 3,000-strong army, 70% of which 
were drawn from the Nigerian Army outside Monrovia to help supervise the then „irregular‟ 
implementation of the Cotonou Accord and those preceding it, albeit with the assistance of 
the international community whose impact was only really felt from 2003 onwards.  
As Adeyemi (1999:19) noted, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was largely sustained by 
Nigeria‟s willingness to bear the operational costs of the mission and it was by no means an 
easy one, particularly given the complexities associated with Liberia‟s ethnic configuration. 
“Whilst ethnicity was much less of a factor earlier on in the struggle, as the world saw in 
Bosnia, where the manipulation of ethnic differences by its factional leaders for political 
purposes led to a conflict increasingly fought along ethnic lines” (Adeyemi, 1999:19). He 
added that the ethnic politicization of the conflict further embittered the fighting and this led 




      
fires were often used as a calculated attempt to provide some breathing space so as to enable 
the warring factions to consolidate and re-arm” (Adeyemi, 1999:19) 
In response to the appeal for intervention by the ESMC, Nmoma (2006:7) notes that a 
meeting was conveyed in Banjul, Gambia, where Dr Amos Sawyer was appointed the 
president of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). However, Charles Taylor‟s 
conspicuous absence at the conference was a setback to the relative progress that had already 
been made by the Sawyer-led and Monrovia-based IGNU. While the Sawyer-led IGNU 
remained in control of the capital, Monrovia, the NPFL under the auspices of Taylor, 
remained in firm control of the remaining parts of the country, thus dividing the country into 
two effective seats of government and two effective currencies (Nmoma, 2006).  
Undeterred by this development, ECOWAS remained insistent on its drive for peace in war-
torn Liberia. Drawing inspiration from Nigeria‟s relentless commitment including the 
deployment of its financial and military resources to achieve peace in Liberia, a number of 
meetings were scheduled of the contending forces, with the aim of brokering peace. The first 
in the series of such accords was held in Ivory-Coast from 29 and 30 October 1991; it is 
known as the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. The meeting was attended by Dr Amos C. Sawyer, 
President of the Interim Government of Liberia; Mr Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL); Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, the then Secretary-General of the now 
defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU); and Mrs Dayle E. Spencer, who at that time 
was the special representative of the International Negotiations Network (INN). The meeting 
subsequently reached an agreement on the implementation of a peace plan that would include 
the encampment and disarmament of the warring factions under the supervision of the 
Nigerian-led expanded ECOMOG force, as well as the establishment of transitional 
institutions that could bring about democratic elections in Liberia (Ero, 1995; Nwolise, 1992; 
Adebajo, 2002; and  Adebajo, 2008). 
 
Following the failure of the warring parties to honor the agreement reached in 
Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, another peace effort was subsequently conveyed by the 
leadership of ECOWAS, led by Nigeria‟s Ibrahim Babangida in Cotonou, the capital of 
Benin Republic on 25 July, 1992. The meeting called for the establishment of a government 
of national unity and further appealed to all parties to observe the ceasefire. This ceasefire 
was later to be supervised by the UN that had increasingly become interested in the Liberian 




      
prioritization of the need for a supra-national intervention. The Cotonou Accord of 1992 
drawn up by the leadership of the Interim Government of National Unity and representatives 
of the leadership of the two main warring factions; the United Liberation Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The leadership of 
the Heads of State of ECOWAS member countries, led by Nigeria, stood as guarantors for 
the implementation of the agreements reached (Ero, 1995: Nwolise, 1992: Adebajo, 2002; 
and Adebajo, 2008). 
 
The Cotonou Accord remains the most all-encompassing truce ever signed on Liberia. The 
agreement covered a total of 19 articles; which ranged from “ceasefire, disarmament, 
demobilization, the structure of the proposed transitional government, election modalities, 
repatriation of refugees and a general amnesty plan”. The peace plan was conceived and 
executed by the ECOWAS, OAU and the UN. The signatories to the agreements reached at 
the meeting included representatives of the IGNU, ULIMO, and the NPFL. Although the UN 
played a substantial role on the road to Liberia‟s peace process, achieving peace in Liberia 
would have almost been impossible, save for Nigeria‟s intervention through the 
instrumentalities of ECOWAS/ECOMOG. This intervention is even more significant because 
it happened at a time when the world was still uncertain about the pattern which the crisis in 
Liberia would follow, including the dimension(s) which the intervention should take.  
 
Although the ECOMOG mission in Liberia drew to a close in 1998, a strong detachment of 
about of 5,000 (out of which about 3,500 were members of the Nigerian Army) troops 
remained in Liberia, albeit largely in a capacity-building role. This saw them helping with the 
training of what was to later become the new Liberian armed forces and also the police force. 
However, by January 1999, ECOMOG was forced to withdraw a large chunk of its troops 
after disputes broke out between ECOMOG‟s forces and Taylor‟s erstwhile loyalists who 
now formed a greater percentage of the newly reconstituted Liberian Armed Forces. These 
disputes were caused by complaints of maltreatment by ECOMOG troops at the hands of the 
Liberian forces (Adebajo, 2008). 
 
Despite its relative state of non-preparedness and inexperience in undertaking peace missions 
in volatile areas, through the ECOMOG, Nigeria played a crucial role in momentarily halting 
the NPFL‟s violent assault against the ill-equipped, poorly-paid and demotivated Liberian 




      
80% of the foot soldiers who were instrumental in the restoration of peace in Liberia. 
Furthermore, the financial cost of the seven-year intervention was shouldered by the 
government of Nigeria, as in the Chadian conflict in 1980 (Omede, 1995; and Adeyemi, 
1999).  
As a result of this intervention, an interim government under Nigeria‟s watch and the 
leadership of Amos Sawyer was put in place in 2003 and elections were held. Charles Taylor 
emerged victorious and became president; he was sworn into office on August 2, 1997. Long 
before his emergence as president, Taylor had held sway in Liberia‟s chequered history, 
particularly during the events leading to the war and courtesy of the support he received from 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Libya16 (See also Tuck, 2000:1; Adebajo, and Ismail, 
2004:12; and Akande, 2005:2).  
Adebajo, and Ismail (2004:12) noted that on assumption of office as the 22nd President of 
Liberia, Charles Taylor immediately called for an end to ECOMOG‟s operations in Liberia; a 
development which has been described by close observers of the Liberian crisis as a violation 
of an agreement reached earlier. This agreement would have seen the ECOMOG oversee the 
training of the newly integrated professional army that was hitherto part of the disbanded 
guerrilla fighters. Taylor also ignored all those who had fought against the brutal regime of 
Samuel Doe, causing the rebels to embark on a revenge mission against him just as he did 
against Samuel Doe. This led to the outbreak of the second civil war from 1997 to 2003.    
 
3.7 Assessing Post-conflict Reconstruction Efforts in Liberia 
The Role of the United Nations (UN) 
The UN‟s involvement in Liberia was necessitated by the ratification of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 866 of (2003) which approved the constitution of a 
                                                          
16 Charles Taylor remained very active and became a major force to reckon with during the war because of the 
supply of ammunitions and other financial resources he freely got from the governments of Burkina Faso and 
Ivory Coast for several reasons. Amongst this reasons however were the desire to revenge the killing of  
President William Tolbert‟s son who was murdered alongside his father was married to the daughter of Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny (the then Ivorian leader) also, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was also married to the 
daughter of Felix Houphouet-Boigny- they wanted outright revenge against President Samuel Doe for killing 






      
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). However, as Akande, (2005:4) 
observed, the late involvement of the United Nations left it confined within the framework 
and strategies that were already been used by ECOWAS. This problem also extended to its 
command and control structures, with UNOMIL having to compete with arrangements that in 
many cases had been established for years. The exclusive authority assigned to the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) were widely regarded as inadequate and the 
degree of authority over ECOMOG was unclear; the SRSG was therefore left to function 
more as a mere "co-coordinator" with both the UNOMIL and ECOMOG having different and 
independent lines of command. Thus, “there was no one to decide categorically when, where, 
or how ECOMOG was to support the UNOMIL teams” (Akande, 2005:4). 
Irrespective of this seeming loophole in the command structure and in the working 
relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMIL, Akande (2005:5) noted that a general 
election was eventually held in 2005 and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected president of 
Liberia. Following her election, the UN wasted no time in signifying its intention to try Mr 
Taylor for war crimes in a UN Special Court that was to sit in Sierra Leone. Subsequently, 
Resolution 1638 of 2005 came into force; it empowered the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL17) to arrest, detain and transfer Mr Taylor to the UN court in Sierra Leone if 
he showed up in Liberia”. Taylor never showed up to answer any of these charges.  
Resolution 1638 of 2005 also expressed gratitude to Nigeria and its President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, for Nigeria‟s relentless commitment to ensuring a free, peaceful and democratic 
Liberia and for its leadership role in West Africa. It was acknowledged that Nigeria had acted 
within international ethical guidelines by providing a temporary stay for the former Liberian 
warlord; Charles Taylor in Nigeria (Akande, 2005:5). 
Close observers of the post-Taylor era in Liberia are of the opinion that Resolution 1638 of 
2005‟s acknowledgement of Nigeria‟s contribution to the restoration of peace in Liberia was 
intended to massage the ego of the country‟s former president, Olusegun Obasanjo who was 
believed to be a no-nonsense man and a firm respecter of the African cause going by his 
antecedents while he was military head of state between 1976 and 1979. It could therefore be 
argued that, Resolution 1638 of 2005 was more of a political and diplomatic necessity and 
                                                          
17 The United Nations Mission in Liberia was a follow up to the earlier UN intervention named the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia. The mission was established courtesy of UNSCR 1309 of 2003. The 
mission initially comprised of about 15,000 UN personnel. UNMIL came into full force in 2003 at a time when 




      
did not carry the affirmative weight usually attached to such resolutions.  Technically, one 
could also say that it was intended to avoid a diplomatic face-off with Nigeria as regards the 
latter‟s possible reluctance to hand over Charles Taylor to the UN Special Court on War 
Crimes which sat in The Hague.18 At the same time, it could also be interpreted as a note of 
warning to Taylor to remind him of the temporary nature of his asylum in Nigeria and the 
need for him to stay out of Liberia, particularly given the speculation that Taylor might still 
be meddling in the politics of Liberia, even after his relocation to Nigeria. 
The Influence of the United States of America 
As Nmoma (2006) noted, the government of the United States (US) could not be said to have 
met the expectations of the international community and that of the Liberian people during 
the country‟s 13-year year civil war. One would have expected that given the close historical 
ties between the two countries, the US ought to have been at the vanguard of the roles that 
were later assumed by the likes of ECOWAS and the UN; rather than the last minute supply 
of military assistance and expertise which the US offered. Some analysts have argued that the 
US‟s lack of concern regarding to the plight of Liberians can be best understood from the 
perspective of the possible consequences of the end of the Cold War. Adebajo (2008:176) 
noted that this accounted for a relative loss of strategic interest in Africa by the West.  
Cobbs (2003:1) similarly noted that the US‟s lack of concern about the crises in Liberia drew 
much criticism and became a matter of public and political discourse on the continent 
because it coincided with the visit of the then US President, George W. Bush to Africa in 
2003. During the visit, President Bush was confronted with questions from the international 
community as to why the US had chosen to assume a non-participant role in the Liberian 
                                                          
18The UN Special Court on war crimes was an independent tribunal established jointly by the United Nations to 
try serious violations of international humanitarian laws, including crimes against humanity, committed by Mr 
Charles Taylor during the blood diamond saga in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2003, and also all through the 
period of the country‟s civil war. Taylor and two others indicted by the International Criminal Court sitting at 
The Hague, Netherlands in May 2012. He was found guilty of having committed war crimes and other crimes 
against humanity; this was seen as serious violation of the basic principles of modern international humanitarian 
laws. On 30 May, 2012, Mr Taylor alongside two of his accomplices was sentenced to 50 years imprisonment in 
a British court for having committed what the court President; Richard Lussick described as unpardonable 






      
crisis. This confrontation was led by representatives of countries like Britain, France, the AU, 
and ECOWAS. However, in what appeared to be a calculated attempt to evade the questions 
posed to him, Bush declared that he wanted to get enough information before deciding on 
whether or not to send troops to Liberia.  
According to Cobbs (2003:1), former President Bush was quoted thus: “I am in the process of 
gathering the necessary information capable of assisting the United States in making a 
rational decision as to how to enforce and keep the ceasefire in place" Cobb (2003:1). Malan 
(2009: 11) remarked that in what appeared to be a rather late but appreciated effort, the 
government of the United States provided some financial support for the reconstitution of 
Liberia‟s security sector, including the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the 
Ministry of Defense and the funding of the UNMIL supervised police reform in the country. 
This according to him, was necessary because in a volatile sub-region such as West Africa 
and in a country just recovering from conflict, “a newly reconstituted army is not only an 
instrument of security to secure the state of Liberia in an external environment but also an 
institution that ensures the security of its people and property” (Malan, 2009: 11).  
A 15-week training program was organized for new army recruits; this included a three week 
course on Liberian civil society and history, as well as international human rights. This was 
intended to make the “new recruits possess a common base from which to overcome ethnic 
divisions and begin to think of themselves as fellow citizens, rather than as former enemies” 
(USIP, 2007:5). In addition, the US, through one of its Private Military Companies (PMCs); 
DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers, also teamed up with the 
government of Liberia to establish a 2,000 capacity light army. The new Armed of Forces of 
Liberia was intended to be comprised of two infantry battalions, an engineering unit, a 
military police unit, a military band and medical personnel (USIP, 2007). However as 
Zounmenou (2008:8) notes, serious concerns have been expressed about the suitability and 
efficacy of employing private security companies to train a national army, with problems 
such as the lack of transparency in the recruitment process, uncertainties over accountability 
issues and the  loyalty of the new recruits representing the most serious of such concerns. 
The overwhelming impact which the Nigeria-led ECOMOG mission had on the foreign 
policy posture of the United States in West Africa should also be noted. Before the outbreak 
of the war, the entire West African sub-region was often believed to be tied to the apron 




      
who received what, how and when in these countries, and most states within the sub-region 
were believed to be dependent on the US for aid assistance and other forms of official 
development assistance (ODA). However, the assumption of full responsibility by ECOWAS 
seems to have changed this, and it is seen as a major victory over the arrogant multilateral 
posture of the US in the sub-region. It is commendable that Nigeria, a country that has often 
been referred as lacking the characteristics to act as a sub-regional hegemon in West Africa, 
could take such strong command of the situation. For example, it has been noted (see, Idisi 
and Idise, 1996:196; and Adebajo, 2008: 188), that Nigeria‟s success in Liberia represents a 
watershed in the annals of the history of the United States‟ hitherto firm grip on the region. 
For ECOWAS and Nigeria, the Liberian intervention was not just necessary; it was a mission 
whose long term objective was to demonstrate to the US and the West that the sub-region, 
after all, is not just a dumping ground or a failed entity as previously believed. Nigeria, with 
the support of its other willing partners in ECOWAS has shown the US and its associates that 
their days of unquestionable dominance in West Africa‟s socio-political and economic issues, 
if not on the entire continent, are over. Without any form of assistance in Liberia, Nigeria and 
ECOWAS were able to bring the situation under control, thus highlighting how much Africa 
can achieve if and when it works together as a team. It is doubtful if the US will be able to 
regain the hold it used to have on West Africa before the Nigerian-led ECOMOG 
intervention. If this initiative is well built on, it has the capacity to extricate West Africa and 
the continent from the shackles of dependency and the often arrogant and imperialistic 
posture of the US in particular and the West in general in Africa‟s domestic affairs. 
The European Union (EU) 
As observed by Mays (1998), the EU constantly monitored the unfolding events in Liberia, 
especially the peace process. The EU supported the integration of ECOWAS through the 
Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) instrument; and it also rendered some technical 
and diplomatic support to ECOWAS. It helped enforced UN sanctions against the illegal sale 
of diamonds in Liberia. The EU also mandated the Liberian government to respect the 
provisions of Resolution 1343 of 1997 which detail the processes of how sanctions could be 
lifted. It is instructive to note that the imposition of the sanctions in the first place were part 
of a comprehensive strategy targeted at tightening up security in the West African sub-region. 




      
considerable resources it invested in bringing about relative peace in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone being sabotaged by political manipulations at the sub-regional level. 
3.8 Rethinking the Human Development Crisis in Liberia 
It is instructive to note, that ever since the attainment of formal independence in 1847, 
governments at different stages of Liberia‟s political history have never considered human 
capacity development a top priority. This perhaps accounts for why the country‟s human 
development index has been worsening for several decades. For the overwhelming majority 
of Liberians, life has become close to the Hobbesian state of nature: short, solitary, brutish 
and nasty.  
After close to 11 years of in-fighting, (1990-1997 and 1999-2003), which witnessed alarming 
consequences of immeasurable proportion, the Liberian state was granted a moment of 
respite by the ushering in of a new post-conflict order. This saw the ascension to office of 
Africa‟s first female president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on January 16, 2006. Her election raised 
hopes that Liberia‟s perennial human development crisis would at least receive some degree 
of attention. This was affirmed by the President when she said: 
   At the core of the post-conflict human development project in Liberia must be 
an expansion of people’s choices and access to the most valued elements of a 
stable and democratic society; greater access to knowledge; better nutrition 
and health services; more secure livelihood, crime protection and physical 
violence; and a sense of inclusion in community activities (USIP, 2007). 
However, since her assumption of office in 2006, President Sirleaf been unable to clearly 
return the Liberian state to a path of democratization and freedom; a major reason why the 
country went to war. The government seems much too comfortable with the neo-colonial 
construct it inherited from the Americo-Liberians; this may not be unconnected with the fact 
that Johnson herself was a product of this construct, having served as Minister for Finance 
under William Tolbert. 
As noted in a UNMIL 2007 report on Liberia, it has becoming increasingly clear that the: 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, (two arguably imperialist 
economic institutions), have re-established their influence over the Liberian 




      
experiences of various third world countries, these Bretton Woods structures 
have gained notoriety for visiting socio-economic hardships on citizens 
through their neo-liberal incentives which is more often than not, capable of 
rolling back the state under the pretext of guaranteeing them a social safety net 
(UNMIL, 2007:11). 
For a better understanding of the crisis of underdevelopment which the Liberian state faces, 
this study examines the economic and social dimensions of the crisis. 
 
The Economic Dimension   
Table 1: Liberia’s Economic Development Indicators, 1985 -2009 
Indicator    1985     2009       
Unemployment 85 68 
Poverty Rate (%)  (percentage of People Living on less than 
$1/day) 
86.1 76.2 
Sources: the United Nations Development Program, Liberia: Human Development 
Report, 2010, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010:1) and the United Nations 
Development Program, Human Development Report, 1990, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990:132). 
The economic indicators shown in table 1 vividly capture the two most important indices for 
the measurement of the human development crisis in Liberia: unemployment and the poverty 
rate. As shown in table 1, in 1985 85% of Liberians were unemployed; by 2009, the figure 
had dropped to 68%. The percentage of Liberians living in abject poverty in 1985 stood at 
86.1%, thus implying that only about 13.9% of the country‟s 1.5 million citizens were living 
above the poverty line. Twenty-four years later, in 2009, the figure dropped slightly to 
76.2%. These economic indicators imply that little has changed in the country, six years after 
the war ended (2003).  
This brings to the fore the seeming inability of the state to overcome the damaging 




      
formulate and implement the requisite policies that could help create enough jobs to free the 
Liberian people from the tightening net of deprivation and abject poverty. It is important to 
note that this does not suggest that the Liberian state is where it is today because of the 
effects of the war alone.  While this was partly responsible for its stagnation and endemic 
poverty, it is also imperative to note, that the socio-economic and political configuration of 
the Liberian state since independence tends towards to a neo-colonial construct where the few 
(Americo-Liberians) have maintained an overwhelming hegemony over the majority 
(Natives). It may take some time and it will also require a focused and visionary government 
to address these structural and system inadequacies which continue to widen the gap between 
the rich and the poor.    
 
The Social Dimension(s) 
Table 2 below presents a more comprehensive analysis of the prevailing social conditions in 
Liberia. It shows that while there have been some improvements in crucial areas of people‟s 
lives, there has also been a measure of stagnation or further retrogression in people‟s standard 
of living. In 1985, the country‟s population stood at more than 1.1 million people; by 2009 
the population has increased to more than 3.6 million. While there appears to be an 
appreciable level of improvement in the adult literacy level, no data were available in 1985 to 
measure illiteracy. However, the 2009 figures show that about 43.17% of the country‟s 
population could still not read and write.   
Regarding the adult and child mortality rate, the indicators are not encouraging; the situation 
appears to be degenerating, except for the relatively stagnant death rate which shows that 
Liberians are struggling to hold on, even in the face of uncertainty. In 2009, at least 72 out of 
every 1,000 children died at birth, the maternal mortality rate was pegged at 578 out of every 
100,000 Liberians. Only about 31.64% of Liberia‟s 3.6 million people have access to 
education, and only about 46% of the population has access to health care. As noted by Ero, 
(2005), these indices reflect a country that is yet to fully come to terms with the catastrophic 
consequences of a war, estimated to have cost more than 150, 000 lives and rendered more 
than 200,000 people homeless. 
Again, it is imperative to note that those worst hit by these negative scenarios are the natives 




      
has been characterized by socio-political and economic discrimination. This is reminiscent of 
the relationship which existed between the feudal lords (America-Liberians) and the serfs 
(natives); adding to this is the age-long distrust within Liberian society itself, (particularly 
among the natives) which is unrepentantly divided along ethnic lines. In states with these 
kinds of prevailing circumstances, it is more difficult for things to return to normal after two 
catastrophic civil wars. Certainly, considerable progress in socio-economic conditions will 
require more time.  
 
Table 2: Liberia's Social Human Development Indicators, 1985 – 2009 
Indicator  1985   2009 
Population  (in Millions)     1.1 3.62 
Adult literacy rate (%)     54  63.74 
Illiteracy Rate (%)      NA 43.17 
Adult mortality (probability of people dying between the ages of 18-
59 per 100,000) 
     578 994 
Child mortality (probability of children dying under the age of 5 
years) per 1,000 population 
78 114.60 
Death rate (%) per 1,000 population 10 10.97 
Life expectancy (years) 55 47 
Infant Mortality rate (%) (per 1,000 live Births) NA 72 
Maternal Mortality Rate ( per 100,000 live Births)                                       NA 578 
People with access to access to Education (%) NA 31.46 
People with access to health services (%) 39 46 
Sources: United Nations Development Program, Liberia: Millennium Development 




      
Planning and Economic Affairs, Economic Surveys of Liberia, (Monrovia: Government 
Printing Office, 1986) 
 The Consequences of the Crisis 
As Zounmenou (2008:8), puts it, “the summary of the perennial human development crisis in 
Liberia is likeable to a termite that has eaten deep into the fabric of the Liberian society”.  
The dimensions of the crisis, reflected in the areas outlined above, show that the country is 
yet to fully recover from the devastating effects of the post Doe and Taylor eras. The 
accumulative effects of years of redundancy and stagnation, decades of unmitigated poverty, 
a nearly non-existent health care system, a lack of portable water and a systemic culture of 
poor sanitation has made it practically impossible for the majority of Liberians to maximize 
their human potential that could see them live a healthy and economically productive life.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided background information on the Liberian state and the raison d’tre 
for the crises. It identified the age-old distrust between the Americo Liberians and the Natives 
as one of the explanations for Samuel Doe‟s ascendancy to office in 1980. The Liberian 
conflict was caused by a combination of bad governance on the part of the Americo-Liberians 
and Samuel Doe, whose despotic, overbearing attitude and totalitarian leadership style was 
unbearable to the NPFL movement led by Charles Taylor. Doe‟s government was allegedly 
characterized by political exclusion, marginalization, and tribalism and this led to several 
orchestrated demands for social change and political reform. Doe‟s failure to accede to any of 
its demands led the rebel group under the auspices of the NPFL to take up arms against his 
regime.  
This chapter has further revealed that the struggle for natural resources such as gold, 
diamonds and coal, which were exploited to sustain the struggle, was a major motivation for 
the protracted nature of the crisis. The war was also driven by selfish political ambitions and 
greed on the part of the warlords, as evidenced by the struggle for control over the mineral-
rich regions of Liberia. An appraisal of the arguments for and against Nigeria‟s intervention 
in Liberia revealed that the combination of the personal leadership aspirations of Gen. 
Ibrahim Babangida, through the use of the army and the enforcement of the sanctity of 




      
This chapter also considered the roles played by various state and non-actors both in the 
resolution of the Liberian crisis and in the post-reconstruction efforts in Liberia. It  concluded 
by providing selected socio-economic indices to emphasize that the Liberian state is still in a 
conflict recovery stage more than nine years after the war officially ended. It is submitted that 
for the Liberian state to be able to escape from humanitarian development catastrophe; a 
crisis that has been further exacerbated by the continuation of its neo-colonial construct, the 
country must endeavor to quickly embrace the part of „real‟ democratization. The alternative 
to doing so could be a return to its „dark days‟. The following chapter examines the nature of 
the Nigerian state, its foreign policy making instrument, and its contribution to peace building 
and conflict resolution in Africa. The chapter will also establish the (possible) nexus between 
this intervention and others that Nigeria has undertaken in Africa within the dictates of the 




      
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Nigerian State, its Foreign Policy Institutions and its History with Conflict 
Resolution in Africa  
4.1 Introduction 
Having undertaken a review of the nexus between Nigeria‟s foreign policy and its role in the 
resolution of the Liberian crisis, this chapter interrogates Nigeria‟s role in peace building and 
conflict resolution in Africa, particularly when considered from its foreign policy perspective. 
It also examines the history and nature of the Nigerian state, and the major instruments of its 
foreign policy formulation. The chapter will also provide a tabular representation of Nigeria‟s 
involvement in conflict resolution in Africa and around the world. It concludes with an 
examination of how Nigeria‟s rich history in conflict resolution in Africa can be channeled to 
the betterment and enhancement of its status as a regional hegemon in Africa and also to the 
well-being of its people both at home and abroad. 
 
4.2 Nigeria’s Political History in Brief 
Nigeria‟s political history is deeply rooted in the events leading to her independence in 1960 
and the subsequent amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by Lord Lugard 
in 1914. The country‟s first taste of political leadership was occasioned by the indirect rule 
system of government foisted on it by its British colonial masters. This saw a total of seven 
British Governor-Generals presiding over the affairs of the territory.19 The only Nigerian to 
be appointed to that position was Sir Nnamdi Azikwe, whose authority was largely 
subservient to the British monarchy and who thus wielded only ceremonial powers between 
1960 and 1963, when the country attained a republican status.  
To date, Nigeria‟s political experiment has taken it through six different republics spanning 
from 1960 to 2012. Sir Tafawa Balewa became Nigeria‟s first Prime Minister on October 1, 
1960; however, the life of that administration was cut short on 15 of January, 1966, in a 
foiled military coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The major political 
beneficiary of that coup, General Aguiyi Ironsi served as Head of State until July 27, 1966 
                                                          
19 Nigeria‟s past Governor-Generals included: Sirs Lord Lugard, (1914-1919); Hugh Clifford (1919-1925); 
Graeme Thomson (1925-1935); Donald Cameron (1931-1935) Henry Bourdillon (1935-1943); Arthur Richards 




      
when he was overthrown in a counter coup led by Gen. Yakubu Gowon. Gowon remained in 
office until 1975 when he was displaced by a bloodless coup spearheaded by Gen. Murtala 
Mohammed. Following the assassination of General Mohammed on February 13, 1976, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo assumed the mantle of leadership and successfully handed over 
the reins of power to a democratically elected government led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari on 
October 1, 1980. On 31 December 1983, barely three months into the second term of the 
Shagari administration, it was dethroned by Major-General Mohammadu Buhari, who 
announced that he had seized control of power from the civilian regime (See Anam-Ndu, 
1979; and Ajetumobi, 1991). 
The Buhari regime lasted from December 1983 to August 1985 before being over thrown by 
General Babangida, who assumed office first as Head of State and later announced himself as 
President and Commander in Chief. The Babangida regime spanned between August 27, 1985 
and August 27, 1993 before he voluntarily stepped aside following widespread protests and 
demonstrations that greeted the annulment by the administration of the general election held 
in 1993. It is remarkable to note that Babangida, while stepping down from office in 1993,  
had announced the appointment of Ernest Shonekan, as head of what he described as an 
Interim National Government (ING). According to Fawole (2003) and Gambari (2008), 
Shonekan‟s appointment was more of a mere preparatory stratagem intended to eventually 
pave the way for the emergence of General Sani Abacha. Following General Abacha‟s 
controversial death in 1998, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, Abacha‟s second in command 
took over and subsequently supervised the transition to civil rule. 
 
The resultant effect of this was the election into office of Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired 
general and one time military head of state. Following Obasanjo‟s return to power in 1999, he 
embarked on a series of face-saving visits ostensibly to restore the country‟s lost glory in 
foreign relations and also to revive its shrinking status in Africa and indeed around the world. 
While it may be difficult to measure the level of success achieved by the Obasanjo 
administration with respect to enhancing Nigeria‟s status amongst the community of nations, 
it is instructive to note that the Obasanjo administration between 1999 and 2003 succeeded in 
returning Nigeria to its traditional Afro-centric foreign policy posture. Under Obasanjo, 
Nigeria became very influential in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity to 





      
Nigeria was also very instrumental in the formation of the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) in 2002, and was a key player in the restoration to office of President 
Fradique de Menezes of Sao-Tome and Principe who was deposed from office while on a 
state visit to Nigeria in 2003. Obasanjo subsequently won a second term in office and thus 
became the only former military Head of State to achieve this feat. Although scholars such as 
Fawole (2004); Osuntokun, (2008); Gambari, (2008) and Adebajo, (2008) have argued that 
fate and posterity had presented Obasanjo the singular opportunity to correct the „mistakes‟ he 
made while serving as military Head of state between 1976 and 1979, it is left to history to 
decide the extent to which Obasanjo was able to „right‟ his so called „wrongs‟. 
 
Fawole also similarly noted (2008:45) that by the end of Obasanjo‟s second term in office as 
civilian president in 2007, Obasanjo had succeeded in lifting Nigeria from the pariah state 
which it was prior to 1999 to a gradual but progressive path to normalcy. At the expiration of 
his term in May, 2007 and following a general election that was won by Umar Musa Yar‟ 
Adua, Nigeria returned to the foreign policy articulation termed by Ojo Maduekwe, 
(Obasanjo‟s former Minister for Foreign Affairs) as „Citizen Diplomacy‟ (Mbachu, 2007). 
However, it remains to be seen how aggressively the government is pursuing this objective. 
Following Yar‟ Adua‟s death on May 5, 2010, Goodluck Jonathan, (Yar‟ Adua‟s deputy) was 
mandated by constitutional provisions to assume the mantle of leadership first in an acting 
and later in a substantive capacity having won the presidential elections conducted in April, 
2011.  
 
Against this background information, a review of the major institutions, patterns and 
processes of foreign policy making in Nigeria is undertaken with a view to providing a clearer 
understanding of some of the underpinning philosophies behind Nigeria‟s involvement in 
conflict resolution in Africa. 
 
4.3 Towards Understanding Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Making Process 
Four main sources have been identified by Fawole (2004:8) as vital in explaining Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy making. These sources include the role played by institutions such as the 
Nigerian constitution; the Presidency, the body responsible for the day-to-day running of the 
domestic and foreign affairs of the state); the National Assembly, which is constitutionally 




      
agencies of government whose roles and duties are not expressly stated in the constitution.  
Although the roles of these ministries might not have been expressly defined by the 
constitution, their activities at various times, as observed by Fawole (2004:9), could be 
tangential to it. Each of these items is dealt with in the details presented below. 
 
The Constitution    
Nigeria presently operates under the provisions of the 1999 constitution, which is largely seen 
as an amendment to the 1979 version.  The constitution came into effect in May 1999, 
following the country‟s return to civilian rule and it thus recognized some state institutions 
and structures as having inextricable relationships with the conduct of foreign policy. 
Specifically, Section 19, sub section II of the 1999 constitution recognizes the broad 
principles encapsulated in Nigeria‟s foreign policy as including the: 
 
(1) promotion and protection of the national interest; 
(2) promotion of African integration and support for African unity; 
(3) promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and 
mutual respect among all nations and the elimination of discrimination in all 
manifestations;  
(4) respect for international law and treaty as well seeking of settlement of international 
disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and 
(5) promotion of a just world order. 
 
However, one noticeable flaw in the 1999 constitution pointed out by Fawole (2004:9) is its 
failure to spell out the actual content or direction of the Nigeria‟s foreign policy. This is 
evident in the preamble of the constitution where it is stated that: 
 
We the people of Nigeria firmly and solemnly resolved to promote inter-
African Solidarity, World Peace, and International Cooperation and 
Understanding (Constitution of the FRN, 1999). 
 
Given this rather generalized conception of foreign policy in the 1999 constitution,  the 
leadership of the country is thus called on to determine the shape and specific direction which 




      
and content of the national interest that are left to the imagination of discerning minds, three 
out of the four succeeding objectives as stated above are merely grand, idealistic, altruistic 
and largely unrealizable foreign policy objectives” (Fawole, 2000:281). 
 
The Presidency 
Nigeria is presently modelled after the American presidential system of government, whose 
emphasis is premised on a strong presidency. This system incorporates three principal arms of 
government (the Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary) and the system of government 
associated with it is usually known as federalism.20 However in the Nigerian case, the 
country‟s colonial antecedents and its long history of military rule have corrupted the idea 
behind the federalist political system. This has resulted in a political situation in which the 
presidency has become associated with so much power which has been described by Fawole 
(2004:11) as “an imperial presidency”.21 Top on the list of the responsibilities of the 
Presidency according to Section 2, sub-section (2) of the 1999 constitution includes; setting 
the agenda for domestic and foreign policies, sending bills to the national assembly, and 
assenting or withholding bills from the National Assembly. The president also runs the affairs 
of the state on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Fawole (2004:12) equally notes that by virtue of the powers conferred by the constitution on 
the presidency with regards to foreign policy making, the president is expected to set an 
agenda according to his vision, his party manifesto and programmes and also in line with the 
dynamics of world politics. He is seen as the chief maker of both domestic and external 
policies and the principal actor on foreign matters. On behalf of the government and people 
of Nigeria, the president is expected to conduct diplomatic visits and sign bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and agreements with other sovereign nations. However, it is in important 
to note that in the history of Nigeria‟s contemporary foreign relations, its foreign policy has 
                                                          
20 Federalism according to Wheare (1946), refers to a system of government where power is shared among the 
federating or component units and thus creates a political order which allows these units some form of 
autonomy to act and make decisions on behalf of their subjects, except when the matter at hand clashes with the 
constitutional provisions of the country and that of the federal government.  
 
21 Fawole (2004) interprets an „imperial presidency‟ to mean a political situation where the presidency, courtesy 
of its long years of military dictatorship, has been reduced to a mere unitary system of government in actual 
practice although not in nomenclature. Under this system, the presidency wields a near absolute and overbearing 
power and this is reflected in the responsibilities attached to the central government, including the politics of 




      
always been dependent on the quality of the president, his/her ideological orientation and 
his/her ability to grasp the nuances of the dynamics of the ever changing diplomatic world.  
This explains how the moderate, conservative, religious and moralistic foreign policy outlook 
of the Balewa regime, the quiet „gentlemanly‟ attitude of the Gowon administration, the 
arguably timid and unconfident foreign policy disposition of the government of Sheu Shagari, 
and the radical and „aggressive‟ external policy approach of the Murtala-Obasanjo regime 
were brought to bear on their administration‟s approach to and in the pursuit of foreign policy 
issues. The same goes for the impressive, courageous and initiative taking foreign policy 
concentration of the Babangida regime, the reclusive foreign policy instinct of the Abacha 
regime and Abdul Salam‟s quiet diplomacy. 
It is also instructive to note, that regardless of the fact that Nigeria‟s presidentialism is 
modelled on that of the United States of America, there is still a wide gap between what 
obtains in the American federal system and that of Nigeria. For instance, unlike in America, 
all the main coercive and key apparatus of state such as the police, army, and other security 
and intelligence agencies are under the command and control of the presidency.  
 
As a consequence of this constitutional provision, the description of a serving governor under 
the Nigerian federal structure as the chief executive of a state could thus be interpreted as 
merely ceremonial. This is because the actual control of the security agencies whose title the 
Governor bears is constitutionally vested in the central government and it is also listed as its 
exclusive preserve. This may be regarded as a major defect of the Nigerian federal 
arrangement.  
 
The National Assembly 
The constitutional framework recognizing Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic (1999 to date) is 
anchored on the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, The constitution provides for a bi-
cameral Legislature; the Senate and the Federal House of Representatives. The Senate is 
composed of 109 members, chosen on an equal basis across the 36 states of Nigeria; while 
the House of Representatives is composed of 360 members representing federal 
constituencies chosen on a proportional representation basis. The members of the National 




      
meet the age and educational requirements (Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria).  
In Nigeria, the constitutional responsibilities of the legislature include law making and 
influencing government policies through motions and resolutions. However, some 
responsibilities are the exclusive preserve of the Senate. These include the screening and 
confirmation of the members of the Federal Executive Council, otherwise known as Ministers 
and ambassadorial nominees. Both houses are constitutionally mandated to sit for a minimum 
of 181 days a year. 
In terms of foreign policy making, the combined arms of the legislature perform a much 
greater function. Section 2, sub section (1) of the 1999 constitution confers on the National 
Assembly the power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation 
or any part thereof. Its powers over the direction and conduct of Nigeria‟s foreign policy 
contained in Sections 80, 81 and 82 of the 1999 Constitution include its ability to control the 
national treasury. This implies that no funds can be withdrawn from the country‟s 
Consolidated Revenue Fund without its approval; the executive arm of government makes its 
requests for funds to the legislature through budget proposals but it cannot embark on any 
spending until its gets confirmation from the legislature, 
As Fawole (2008:14) notes, all ministries and parastatals including the Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have to defend their budget proposals before the committee on foreign policy 
of the National Assembly. Funds meant for foreign policy articulation and pursuit may be 
denied if such initiatives are found to be inconsistent with the nation‟s national interest. The 
National Assembly, in terms of the provisions of Section 5(4a) wields sufficient influence 
over the executive, particularly when it comes to when the nation can go to war. Should such 
a request by the executive be turned down by the Assembly, the government through the 
executive cannot go to war except in emergency situations where the President needs to 
respond to any threat considered an affront to the country‟s territorial sovereignty and that of 
its people.    
Other areas where the National Assembly can exercise its authority on foreign policy matters 
include the ratification of both bilateral and multilateral treaties agreed to by the executive. 
This power is vested in the National Assembly by Sections 11 and 12; without the National 
Assembly‟s ratification, such treaties are mere diplomatic parleys and as such are 




      
some level of control in terms of granting or withholding approval for the Ministerial and 
Ambassadorial nominees appointed by the President acting under the provisions of Section 
171 of the 1999 constitution (Fawole, 2004:15). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The essential responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is conducting and 
managing external affairs; for this reason, the ministry is usually staffed by highly trained 
officers with practical, theoretical knowledge and a technical grasp of foreign affairs. In 
represents the main implementation arm of foreign policy and Nigeria‟s High Commissions, 
embassies, and other diplomatic representations fall under its jurisdiction. It also services all 
of Nigeria‟s 94 diplomatic missions including the country‟s interest in international 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Commonwealth (Fawole, 2004:17). 
It should be noted that the MFA is not the only ministry that performs a central role in the 
conduct of foreign policy. Several other ministries, parastatals and, other specialized agencies 
such as the ministries of Cooperation and Integration; Defense; Finance, Trade and 
Commerce; Industry and Agriculture, Petroleum Resources, and the National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA) work in concert with the MFA to ensure that Nigeria‟s foreign policy specifics 
are well advanced within the community of nations.   
In the practice of international diplomacy, states no longer leave their foreign policy concerns 
in the hands of individuals without the required background; modern diplomacy has become 
too complex an activity to be left to professional diplomats with narrow specializations to 
handle (Fawole, 2004:17). Emerging world trends go beyond mere political and diplomatic 
matters. This view is well articulated by Le Pere and Nieuwkerk (2002:188): 
 The world can no longer be understood in the monochromatic colors of the 
Cold War- it is definitely more complex, driven by impulses which require a 
range of new and overlapping policy instruments and resources. Foreign 
policy now include issues as diverse as investment, migration, energy, 
inflation, food security, human rights, the natural environment and so on 
(Nieuwkerk 2002:188). 
Flowing from the above observation, one should take into cognizance the role that issues such 




      
information and communications technology, and international trade play in foreign policy 
articulation and propagation. Indeed, the world has now become a global village, and for a 
state to be able to compete favorably with its contemporaries on all of the issues raised above, 
it must involve other governmental infrastructure in the conduct of its foreign policy. This 
role is sacrosanct and requires a great deal of professionalism and diplomacy to protect the 
nation‟s national interests.  
The following section provides a brief discussion of the intrinsic relationship between the 
different regime types Nigeria has passed through and the foreign policy orientation of its 
governments particularly from the point of view of their level of commitment to Nigeria‟s 
traditional Afro-centric posture. 
 
4.4 Regime Type, Foreign Policy Orientation and Commitment to Afro-centrism 
Research by scholars such as Aluko (1981), Akinyemi (1989), Abegunrin (2003), Fawole 
(2003) and Akinterinwa (2010) has captured Nigeria‟s national interest as: National self-
preservation, defending national sovereignty and independence, protecting the socio-
economic and political interests of Nigerians, ensuring the defense, preservation and 
promotion of democratic norms and values, enhancing Nigeria‟s standing and status in Africa, 
and the promotion of world peace. Similarly, scholars such as Idang (1973:1-5), Ogunsanwo 
(1986:1-4) and Gambari (1989:2-7) argue that Nigeria‟s national interest is best considered 
from the perspective of its regional and continental leadership drives. This ambition, 
according to these scholars represents the underpinning philosophy and overriding impetus 
which led to Nigeria‟s adoption of a policy of “four concentric circles” as espoused earlier. 
Prominent among Nigeria‟s achievements were its contribution to the birth(s) of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and ECOWAS in 1975, the attainment of 
independence by Angola and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1975 and 1980 respectively, 
Nigeria‟s active participation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa including the 
frontline role it played in the resolution of the civil wars in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and in 
the eventual demise of apartheid in Namibia in 1988 and later in South Africa in 1994, among 
others.  However, despite these successes, this Africa-centered foreign policy was not without 





      
These flaws, according to Aluko (1981), Abegunrin (2003), Fawole (2003), and Adebajo and 
Mustapha (2008), were soon to become evident in the downturn experienced by the country in 
its hitherto strong and viable economy and in the neglect of its own domestic responsibilities, 
specifically the fulfillment of the social obligations expected of a government to its people. 
The resultant effect of this was a steady decline in the nation‟s oil revenue owing to a culture 
of poor maintenance, corruption and the extensive projects executed by Nigeria in other 
African countries. Notable among these were the cement and road facility built by the Gowon 
regime in Benin Republic, the sugar factory constructed in Senegal, the huge costs associated 
with funding the liberation movement in Southern Africa, the cost of prosecuting its civil war 
from 1967 to 1970 and the seeming failure of its leadership to take economic advantage of the 
in-roads it was creating courtesy of its interventionist policies in Africa, for the benefit and 
protection of its national interests. 
 
The period between 1985 and 1998 in Nigeria‟s foreign policy history and practice was 
described by Fawole (2003:127-146) as the beginning of ultra-nationalism, xenophobia and 
the beginning of isolationism in Africa, except for the short lived regime of Gen. Buhari 
(1984-1985) and that of Gen. Babangida (1985-1993), both of whom were noted for their 
radical ultra-nationalist and interventionist foreign policy orientation. The Babangida regime 
according to Osaghae, (2002) and Adebajo and Mustapha (2008, p.12), was particularly noted 
for its „zero tolerance‟ for conflict in West Africa; a policy which Babangida executed 
through the instrumentality of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) as evidenced in Nigeria‟s commanding role in the civil wars in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. 
 
The essential foreign policy thrust of the Babangida regime was anchored on the wings of the 
protection of the national interest, Afro-centrism, strengthening good neighborliness among 
its contiguous states and the pursuance of greater economic integration within the West 
African sub-region. Notable among the defining moments of that administration were the 
introduction of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme under the supervision of the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi, the tactical adoption of  “economic diplomacy”22 as the 
                                                          
22Economic diplomacy according to Atah (2011) can be credited to Nigeria‟s former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; Gen. Ike Nwachukwu. The idea seeks to facilitate the promotion of export trade, investment and 
increased financial assistance from friendly countries. The policy was said to have been inspired by the 




      
country‟s new foreign policy drive and the renewed bite which the administration gave to the 
campaign against apartheid in South Africa, as well as commencing diplomatic ties with 
Israel and the over bearing role it played in the resolution of the Liberian crisis. 
 
However, the succeeding regime of General Abacha plunged Nigeria into what Osaghae 
(2002:194-196) and Fawole (2003:127) call “Nigeria‟s era of foreign policy isolationism”; a 
„feat‟ achieved courtesy of the dictatorial and totalitarian Gen. Sani Abacha. Abacha‟s style 
of foreign policy administration was characterized by a high degree of inconsistency and 
incoherence judging by its ambivalence and quickness to react to international issues without 
taking cognizance of the cost implications of such decisions.  The junta dissipated needless 
energy on maintaining its monopoly on the country while fending off every attempt by the 
international community to categorize it as a pariah state. In the words of Osaghae 
(2002:194-196) “Abacha saw it more as a „struggle for survival‟ and the Nigerian state 
witnessed a foreign policy era in which „isolationism‟ was the rule rather than the „exception‟ 
thus seeing diplomacy being replaced by bull fighting. And the country was counting more 
enemies instead of making more friends”  
 
A number of pro-democracy activists were detained and some unfortunately paid the supreme 
price with their lives, but the eventual execution of the late leader of the defunct Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSSOP), Ken Saro–Wiwa despite widespread an 
international appeal for a state pardon appeared to be the turning point for the Abacha regime. 
Nigeria was subsequently suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations23 and automatically 
became a pariah state within the community of nations. Thus all the previous gains the 
country had attained over the years were eroded courtesy of the reckless abandon with which 
Gen. Abacha ran the country.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Program (SAP). The highpoints of the policy were the priority it placed on export promotion, the 
encouragement it gave to direct foreign investment, debt rescheduling, the embracement of neo-liberal measures 
and deep involvement in the interplay of the capitalist political economy. 
23 The Commonwealth of Nations comprises of fifty four countries (54) excluding Mozambique and Rwanda 
which were not colonized by Great Britain. The group seeks to encourage member states to cooperate within a 
framework of common values and goals, as stipulated in the Singapore Declaration. These include the 
promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance, and the rule of law, individual liberty, egalitarianism, 
free trade, multilateralism, and world peace. The association is not political; rather it is an intergovernmental 





      
Following the death of Gen. Abacha on June 8, 1998, General Abdul- Salami Abubakar took 
over the reins of power. He set himself the task of midwifing the re-birth of civilian rule in 
Nigeria and also made an appreciable impact in bringing some sanity into both the domestic 
terrain and the country‟s external relations.  He also succeeded in placing Nigeria back on 
track on the international scene by encouraging the country to participate in a number of 
privatization programmes, including investing in a nuber of export-oriented industries and the 
campaign for debt relief. On return to democracy on 29 May 1999, and the return to office of 
Olusegun Obasanjo as President, Nigeria undertook its foreign policy drive re-appraised, 
resulting in a shift from Afro-centrism to what Ojo Maduekwe termed citizen diplomacy - a 
policy which, according to Adebajo and Mustapha (2008:12) still awaits take-off.   
 
4.5 Nigeria Role’s in Sub-regional Security 
As Rugumamu (2004:11) observed, Nigeria has undoubtedly played an unparalleled role in 
finding solutions to the plethora of conflicts that have occurred within its sub-region, as 
evidenced in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria‟s strong political will and financial 
support has helped to transform ECOWAS from its trade-based foundation to a security-
based Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This 
according to Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:168), led to the formation of a sub-regional army 
which helped to contain the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra-Leone in the early 1990s. Agedah 
(1993:147) notes that the birth of ECOWAS was a product of the 13th Summit of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held from August 6 -7, 1990 in 
Banjul, the Gambia. The meeting was led by Nigeria‟s former military leader, President 
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, who proposed to the Heads of State and Government of the 16 
West African States present at the meeting the agenda for intervention.  
 
Agedah (1993:147) further argued that Babangida‟s proposal was premised on the need for 
West African leaders to develop a framework that could help remedy West Africa‟s most 
critical structural-functional defects. This included rethinking the political and security 
environment through which economic development could take place and as a result creating a 
more conducive atmosphere for the conduct of economic development. Babangida‟s proposal 
was believed to have been further strengthened by the initial decision of ECOWAS to 
intervene in Liberia (1990-1997) following the refusal of the US to intervene, 




      
Ellis (1999:16), was seen by most West African leaders as an avenue for the experimentation 
of the doctrine of Pax Africana: a term which according to them implies providing African 
solutions to African problems.  
 
While attesting to Nigeria‟s decisive hegemonic role in Africa, Rugumamu (2004:11) also 
noted that, from the conception of ECOMOG to its eventual birth, Nigeria deployed huge 
financial resources to ensure the survival of the group including the contribution of a large 
contingent of troops.  Ellis (1999); Francis (2001); Adebajo (2002a) and Adebajo (2002b) 
observe that between 1990 and 1997, Nigeria, in concert with other willing ECOWAS 
member states deployed more than 12,000 troops to the organization‟s mission in Liberia; 
this is aside from the commitment of other resources. Shoup (2007) also credited the 
ECOMOG with being responsible for the containment of the spill-over effect which the war 
was starting to have on Sierra Leone, particularly for its role in helping to repel the advances 
being made by the rebels towards the country until the United Nations forces arrived in 1998.  
 
Furthermore, Nigeria's diplomatic, financial and military involvement in many of these sub-
regional interventions have helped to shape their processes and outcomes in a decisive 
fashion; a development which has further earned valuable international kudos for the 
Nigerian military dictatorship (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2012:168). Leatherwood (2001:24) 
notes that Nigeria played an exemplary role in the West African sub-region and argues that 
throughout the second term of the Clinton administration, the US was less concerned about 
curbing the spread of conflicts in Africa; Nigeria wasted no time in stepping up its game in 
this regard. According to Berman and Sams (2003:46), this implies that the US was more 
comfortable backing a regional 'anchor' or states, including Nigeria, that were "willing to take 
losses and sustain deployments" Once more, Abuja's military and financial contributions 
dwarfed other states' to the extent that it could "brush aside ... continued diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the crisis and pursued a military solution instead" (Berman and Sams (2003:46) cited 
in Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:169)).  
 
Consequently, as rightly observed by Fayemi (2004:19), the transformation of the war-like 
situation in both Liberia and Sierra Leone into what they are today, are testimony to the 
unprecedented post-conflict state reconstruction predicated on the massive inflow of 
international aid and the laying of an egalitarian economic reconstruction foundation 




      
commitment to peace and stability in Africa was subsequently carried on by the regimes 
which succeeded the Babangida administration. This was exemplified by continued attention 
to the fundamental issue of regional security through the maintenance of troops not only in 
the two war-torn countries (Liberia and Sierra-Leone) in the sub-region but also in Darfur, 
Sudan. A case in point was the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration (1999 – 2007); 
when Nigeria was relentless in its pursuit of the founding objectives of ECOWAS.   
 
Ihonvbere (2004:5) averred that:   
 
Under the current administration, Nigeria’s foreign policy has undergone 
significant refurbishing, reformation and transformation….At another level, 
the President’s stature, credibility, power, influence, and understanding of 
the intricacies of foreign policy….this directly translates into respect for 
Nigeria. Whether you consider Sierra Leone, Liberia, ECOWAS, 
NEPAD…Nigeria’s achievement in Liberia is unprecedented. Without 
American funds or subsidy and with unprecedented courage, Nigeria has 
brought peace to that country, stopped the killings and helped map out a 
new path to recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction. The world has 
acknowledged this feat. And I was present recently when President Blah of 
Liberia visited Nigeria to thank the President and the Nigerian people and 
described President Obasanjo as the “Father of the Liberian nation”. 
 
According to Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:169), the international clout and personality of the  
Obasanjo civilian administration turned Nigeria into a key peace-broker for both the UN and 
the AU. They also noted that Obasanjo's activism within the ECOWAS sub-region and Africa 
as a whole has boosted international support for the doctrine of „Pax Africana'. They 
remarked that this term was beginning to gain more popularity in Europe and in the US, 
where it is perceived as a useful tool for constructive disengagement. Based on the foregoing,  
a tabular illustration of Nigeria‟s involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution is 
presented to facilitate an understanding of how much of a commitment Nigeria has brought to 






      
A Taxonomy of Nigeria’s Participation in Peace keeping around the World  
 
Table 3: Nigeria’s Participation in Global Peace Missions, 1960 - 2011 
SN 
Area/Country 
Name/Acronym Operation  Start date End date 
Congo ONUC United Nations Operation 
in the Congo 
July 1960 June 1964 
Guinea UNSF United Nations Security 













Lebanon UNIFIL United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon 
March 1978 Present 
Iran-Iraq UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq 
Military Observer Group 
August 1988 February 
1991 
Namibia UNTAG United Nations 
Transition Assistance 
Group 
April 1989 March 
1990 
Angola UNAVEM I United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission I 
January 1989 June 1991 






Angola UNAVEM II United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission II 
June 1991 February 
1995 
Cambodia UNTAC United Nations 
Transitional Authority in 





      
Cambodia 






Sierra-Leone  Bilateral Special 
Protection Force in Sierra 
Leone 
1991 1997 
Chad  Nigerian Neutral Force, 
Chad (Bilateral)  
1979  
Chad  OAU Peacekeeping 
Force, Chad  
1981 1982 
Somalia UNOSOM I United Nations Operation 
in Somalia I 
April 1992 March 
1993 
Somalia UNOSOM II United Nations Operation 
in Somalia II 
March 1993 March 
1995 
Liberia UNOMIL United Nations Observer 










United Nations Angola 






Ouzo strip UNASOG United Nations Aouzou 
Strip Observer Group 
May 1994 June 1994 
Rwanda UNAMIR United Nations 






Sierra Leone  ECOMOG Task Force in 





      
Sierra Leone UNAMSIL United Nations Mission 





Liberia ECOMIL LIBERIA  2003  
Congo MONUC United Nations 
Organization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic 









Sudan AMIS African Mission in 
Darfur 
2004- 2008 
Sudan UNAMID African Union-United 
Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur 
July 2007 Present 
Sudan UNMIS United Nations Mission 
in the Sudan 
March 2005 July 2011 
Chad MINURCAT United Nations Mission 
in the Central African 





South Sudan UNMISS United Nations Mission 
in the Republic of South 
Sudan 
July 2011  
 
(Source: Compiled by the Authors with references from the list of the United Nations 








      
 
 
Table 4: Nigeria's Contribution of Peace Commanders and Chief Military Observers, 
1960 - 2009 





1.  Maj. Gen. J.T.U 
Aguiyi-Ironsi 
UN ONUC 1960-1964 Congo 
2.  Brig. Gen 
Ademulegun 




Col. J. Dongoyaro Bilateral HARMONY 
I 
1979 Chad   
4.  Col. M. Magoro Bilateral HARMONY 
I 
1979 Chad 
5.  Maj. Gen. G. Ejiga OAU HARMONY 
II 
1981-1982 Chad 
6.  Maj. Gen. E. 
Unimna* 
UN  UNAVEM I  1991 Angola 




1992-1995 Angola  
8.  Maj. Gen. E. 
Opaleye 
UN UNAMIR 1993 Rwanda 
9.  Maj. Gen. J. 
Dogonyaro 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1990-1991 Liberia  
10.  Maj. Gen. R. 
Kupolati 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1992 Liberia  
11.  Maj. Gen. I. Bakut ECOWAS ECOMOG 1993 Liberia 
12.  Maj. Gen. A. 
Olurin 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1994 Liberia 
13.  Maj. Gen. J. 
Inienger 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1995 Liberia 
14.  Maj. Gen. S. Malu ECOWAS ECOMOG 1996-1997 Liberia 




      
Shelpidi 
16.  Maj. Gen. G. 
Mujakpero 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1999 Liberia 
17.  Maj. Gen. G. 
Kpambe 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1999-2000 Liberia  
18.  Maj. Gen. S. Iliya UN UNMONUC 2003-2005 Congo (Zaire) 
19.  Maj. Gen. J.O. 
Owonibi 
UN UNMIL 2003-2005 Liberia  
20.  Maj. Gen. F. 
Okonkwo 
AU AMIS 2005-2006 Sudan 
21.  Maj. Gen. C. 
Ihekire 
AU AMIS 2006-2007 Sudan 
22.  Maj. Gen. C. 
Obiakor 
UN UNMIL 2006-2009 Liberia 
23.  Maj. Gen. M.L. 
Agwai 
UN/AU UNAMIS 2007-2009 Sudan  
             Source: Compiled by the Author. 
* Chief Military Observer 
**  Chief Military Observer and later Force Commander  
 
4.6 Conclusion - Where is the Citizen in Nigeria’s Afro-centrism? 
This chapter has provided an historical appraisal of the Nigerian state. It is clear that Nigeria 
has been very aggressive in its pursuit of peace in West Africa and on the continent. As 
clearly demonstrated in the tables above, Nigeria has championed the cause of peace much 
more than most (if not all) of its contemporaries in Africa. Considering Africa‟s endemic 
conflict profile and Nigeria‟s role in its resolution, it could be argued that any study of 
conflicts in Africa would also require an examination of Nigeria‟s catalytic role in conflict 
management on the continent, particularly given the country‟s antecedents and experience in 
military operations and peacekeeping around the globe.   
Nigeria has been actively involved in more than 42 global peace operations, committing more 




      
(Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007:140). Nigeria also prides itself on its current global record of having 
the highest involvement of female peacekeepers that have been deployed to serve in several 
peacekeeping missions; the country has consistently ranked fourth out of a total of 118 UN 
troop contributing countries in the world (Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007:140). However, the question 
that arises is; what has been the cost of all these interventions for Nigeria and its people?  
According to reports emanating from the Nigerian Ministry of Defense in 2011, the country 
lost more than 2,000 officers while trying to bring peace to a people it probably never had 
any historical or geographical contiguity with. This is asides the incalculable financial and 
material costs of participating in these missions. This is the price Nigeria has paid for 
freedom, peace and the dignity of the human race. More importantly, all of these 
interventions have been premised on the dictates of the country‟s Africa-centered ideology 
and its foreign policy postulation unwavering commitment to peace, stability and a just world 
order.  
Notwithstanding Nigeria‟s commitment to peace keeping and conflict resolution in Africa, it 
remains to be seen how well this has protected the interests of Nigerians both at home and 
abroad. There is need for the Nigerian government to realize that having spent the larger part 
of its 52 year history for Africa, the country needs to begin to attach socio-economic 
considerations to its peace keeping missions. For instance, there is no law which says the 
Nigerian business community cannot benefit from the supply of humanitarian aid Nigeria 
provides to war-torn nations. It may also not be out of place if Nigerians get the necessary 
political support from the government with regards to taking up key positions in supra-
national institutions such as ECOWAS and the AU. Two key organizations, Nigeria has been 
actively involved with. 
In ECOWAS for example, an institution Nigeria hosts and substantially funds, it is doubtful if 
its citizens get a fair share in terms of the employment opportunities available. One scholar 
sums up the above scenario in this way:  
…..not only did the country (Nigeria) donate substantially towards 
ECOWAS, set up costs including the Secretariat, it regularity paid its 
annual contribution of approximately 32.5% of the Community’s budget 
which was subsequently revised upwards to 40%. In the ECOWAS 




      
is situated here in Abuja. At the African Union since 2003 when Obasanjo 
fielded two female candidates from Nigeria for the same post, making the  
country look unserious, no Nigerian has been elected in the AU Commission 
for the last six years. A nation that has the largest population in Africa is not 
represented in the African Union Commission. Burkina Faso defeated 
Nigeria in 2007! Really, what manner of citizen diplomacy is it when the 
citizens lack representation? (Onyearu 2009 cited in Monday, (2010:8). 
Another case in point was that of Dr Ngozi Ugo, who was nominated for the position of UN 
Ombudsman and the deputy special representative of the Secretary-General in 2007. This 
position required the diplomatic endorsement of her home government - Nigeria. However, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which should ordinarily be at the vanguard of this good news 
and the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation kept foot dragging until she 
eventually lost the post (Monday, 2010: 8). This calls into question the manner of the citizen 
diplomacy Nigeria claims to be practicing when it cannot defend the interest of its citizens. 
As Mahmood (2009:4) observed: 
  Dr. Ugo’s presence in the UN System would have enhanced Nigeria’s 
position for the UN permanent seat. Other more serious countries campaign 
for their citizens and that is why the highest ranking African in the UN system 
is a Tanzanian woman. Go to the Commonwealth Secretariat in London you 
may think you are in India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the 
number of Indians there. And this is where our own Chief Anyaoku served for 
almost four decades. When is Nigeria going to stand and recognize its own? 
It is sad, unfortunate and indeed painful! (Mahmood 2009:4). 
 
These are just instances of the kind of citizen diplomacy the Nigerian government is making 
available to its people. A people who perhaps do not really understand the meaning of real 
governance until general elections are approaching, and politicians swarm around them, sweet 
talking them for votes through the instrumentalities of their possibly ill-gotten wealth and 
empty promises. In view of the forgoing, it is doubtful if the Nigerian government has ever 
been more concerned about its people, notwithstanding the take-off of its much “politicized” 




      
are continually been subjected to all forms of discrimination and hate in their host countries 
and even at the home front.  
 
The cases of the xenophobic attacks on its citizens by a section of the South-African 
population (in 2009) are sharp reminders of the agony its people face just by being citizens of 
the most populous Black nation in the world. At both the Lagos and Abuja offices of the High 
Commissions and Embassies of the major countries in Europe and in America, Nigerians are 
treated with disdain and disrespect, for merely wanting to visit to some of these countries. 
Including being beaten up by security agencies for what the “officers” (who incidentally are 
also Nigerians) call non-compliance with protocol, yet the Nigerian government has not in the 
recent time, particularly after the commencement of the citizen diplomacy approach, risen up 
to strongly condemn these attacks on its people or taken any diplomatic measure to stem this 
tide.  
 
It is doubtful if the American, British or any other government committed to the well-being 
and the protection of the larger interest of its people will allow that type of treatment to be 
meted out to its citizens anywhere in the world. Sad enough, this is happening in Nigeria, 
worse still, on the people‟s home soil. The only thing the Nigerian government has done is to 
watch with rapt attention, while its citizens continue to bear the brunt of this maltreatment and 
their governments‟ ineptitude. The neccesary question that may arise out of these occurencies 
may be; what manner of citizen diplomacy has the Nigerian government adopted in the last 
five years (2007-2012), when it can not use the same to resolve the multiplicity of home 
grown economic and diplomacy related issues confronting its people? 
 
Another case in point is the plight of Nigerians who are still resident in the Bakkassi 
peninsula, an area which used to be part of Nigeria, but was ceded to Cameroon following the 
verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which awarded the oil rich region to that 
country (Cameroon). Following this development, it has been reported in some quarters that 
some Nigerians who have not fully left the region are being treated by the Cameroonian 
authorities in a manner that is not befitting of a people whose government has been more than 
cooperative, particularly judging by the way it accepted the ruling of the ICJ (The Punch, 
December 11, 2012)). These are just a few examples of the way the Nigerian government 





      
In the concluding chapter, attempts shall be made towards providing a way forward on the 
path Nigeria could follow, if it is to achieve a balance between its national interests, its 
hegemonic aspirations and how it can effectively articulate the widely proclaimed citizen 
























      
CHAPTER FIVE 
Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion  
 
5.1 Summary of findings 
This research study has interrogated the essential issues that have influenced Nigeria‟s 
conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, particularly from the perspective of its foreign 
policy over a period of 50 years. It was found that Nigeria has committed substantial 
resources to guarantee sub-regional peace and security in West Africa. The study has 
revealed that there is an inextricable connection between Nigeria‟s foreign policy and its 
interventionist role in Africa. Aside from the constitutional provision which recognizes 
Nigeria‟s Africa-centered ideology, the country‟s involvement in conflicts in Africa have 
often been influenced by the leadership style and political ideology of the individual in 
power.  
The study has further revealed that the national uproar arising from Nigeria‟s ailing economy 
and the plethora of its unresolved homegrown socio-economic and political woes was a 
contributory factor to the Babangida administration‟s search for a reprieve elsewhere, thus 
necessitating the country‟s intervention in Liberia. The Liberian mission was financed and 
executed by Nigeria at a time when its foreign debt stood at $35 billion (in 1995), thus calling 
into question the economic rationality attached to that intervention. It is debatable whether 
any other Western nation, especially after the Somali-intervention, could have matched such 
a huge level of commitment24.  Some would argue that the assumption of such a role by 
Nigeria was an avenue for the regime at that time to score political points did not necessarily 
arise out of a genuine commitment to Liberia‟s peace and stability.  
 
The study has further observed that the claim by the Babangida administration that it went to 
Liberia mainly to protect Nigeria‟s national interest, remains largely unproven, especially 
when considered from the perspective of how well the Nigerian authorities succeeded in 
                                                          
24 Further analysis of the cost of Nigeria‟s involvement in Liberia suggests that Nigeria accounted for more than 
70% of the force and 80% of the funding, thus expending close to $11 billion in the process on an exercise that 
has been argued to have negated institutional procedure. For instance, it has been said that the Liberian mission 
was shrouded in controversies such as the questionable legitimacy of ECOMOG, the issue of poor diplomacy, 




      
achieving this feat. For example, despite its traditional relations with the country, the United 
States did not waste time evacuating its citizens from Liberia, while Nigeria, with no 
relationship with Liberia other than the ECOWAS bond waited and allowed its people to be 
massacred and taken as hostages before the Babangida administration came to their rescue.  
The first chapter of this dissertation outlined the premises on which its other parts of thesis 
would be built. The second chapter undertook a review of Nigeria‟s foreign policy, including 
its centrifugal and centripetal determinants and the constitutional interpretation of these 
provisions. The notion of conflict and its accompanying variants were examined. The third 
chapter interrogated the underlying reasons informing Nigeria‟s interventionist role in 
Liberia. This included a contextualization of the Liberian state; including the roles played by 
different actors in the seven-year war. The fourth chapter focused on the Nigerian state and 
the major institutions responsible for its foreign policy formulation. The chapter concluded 
with an appraisal of Nigeria‟s contribution to peacekeeping missions around the globe. The 
fifth chapter is devoted to the key findings arising from the research study and the policy 
recommendations. 
In terms of the practical application of the qualitative research methodology adopted for the 
study, through the instrumentality of the content analysis approach, the study interrogated 
Nigeria‟s conflict resolution in Africa largely from the perspective of its foreign policy 
approach. The data were gathered through secondary sources, were subjected to empirical 
analysis and were also updated to conform to current trends within the purview of existing 
literature. Theoretically, the adoption of the Realist approach assisted in understanding the 
underpinning reasons behind Nigeria‟s interventionist role in West Africa and in Africa in 
general, particularly when considered from the perspective of the three notions of survival, 
self-help and statism. The study revealed that Nigeria‟s sojourn in Liberia was predicated on 
the need to ensure the continuity of the Liberian state whose existence at that point in time 
was severely under threat; furthermore, there was a need to protect any ECOWAS member 
state from disintegration. The study has shown that Nigeria, like every other state-actor is 
guided by the triple notion of statism, survival and self-help; a core element embedded in 
structural realism. This has led to Nigeria becoming a colossus on the African continent, 
championing the cause of conflict resolution. Whether Nigeria succeeded in protecting its 
national interest in most of these interventions will be shaped and judged by events in the 




      
Nigeria‟s Afrocentric foreign policy prompted its leadership of the ECOWAS / ECOMOG-
led intervention in Liberia; this framework was later adopted for the missions in Sierra 
Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote D‟Ivoire. These missions helped to create conditions that 
further highlight the Africa‟s potential to prevent, manage and resolve its problems on its 




This study has demonstrated that Nigeria‟s interventionist role in the West African sub-region 
and in Africa is a consequence of the dictates of its foreign policy as it pertains to its doctrine 
of four concentric circles and Afro-centrism. It is within this purview that this study offers the 
following recommendations, which if well-articulated, could help to strike a balance between 
the notions of public good (which appears to be the philosophical justification for its 
intervention in conflicts) and the sanctity of its national interest when it comes to conflict 
resolution. 
1. There is an urgent need for the Nigerian state to redefine its responsibilities 
and priorities at the international level to align with the domestic needs of its 
citizenry before considering any external intervention.  
 
2. Given the declining state of Nigeria‟s economy over the last 32 years, (1980-
2012), it is becoming crystal clear that the country, to all intents and purpose, 
no longer has the strength it had at the time when this Africa-centered policy 
was conceived. To this end, it is recommended that Nigeria should situate 
future interventions within the context of economic sustainability and the 
benefits attached to such interventions.  
3. It is also suggested that the country‟s foreign policy, which ought to be a 
dynamic instrument of negotiation and interest articulation, be periodically 






      
4. Nigeria should also consider a redefinition of its national interest and make it 
more people oriented. After all, a government is not seen as responsible if it 
increasingly fails to provide for its people, a source of national identity and 
sense of belonging; this can only be brought about by an improvement in their 
standard of living and in the fulfillment of the basic obligations expected of 
government. As long as Nigerians continue to sleep on the streets owing to the 
failure of the government to provide shelter for them; the unemployment rate 
continues to sky-rocket; the gap between the rich and the poor continues to 
widen and critical infrastructure (such as good roads, a stable electricity 
supply, affordable health care; quality education etc.) continue to elude them, 
the rationality of continuing with an approach that was conceived at a time 
when Nigeria‟s socio-economic and political environment was convivial and 
conducive for such interventions is called into question.  
 
5. It is also advised that Nigeria re-consider the widely held underpinning 
interventionist philosophy that assumes that a threat to international peace and 
security from any part of the continent represents a threat Nigeria. The way in 
which America, China, Russia, the United Kingdom etc. make use of their 
foreign policy should serve as a guideline for Nigeria. The nation must 
discontinue what this study terms „a charity of foreign policy diplomacy‟ or 
intervening in conflicts for hegemonic reasons without consideration of the 
national interests at stake. The world has long since moved from this stage. 
  
6.  It is recommended that the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs be 
restructured and strengthened. If this done effectively, it will enable Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy goals to be translated into a more specific national interest and 
program of action, potent enough to respond in a timely manner to changes in 
the external environment.  
 
7. It is also submitted that for there to be an element of economic rationality in 
Nigeria‟s interventionist missions in the sub-region, the country must insist on 
sharing the burden of peacekeeping in line with the ECOWAS security 
mechanism agreed on in 1999. What happened in Liberia; where the country 




      
cannot be allowed to repeat itself. This is particularly pertinent in the light of 
the fact that the ECOWAS is preparing for another ground assault in Mali, 
ostensibly to restore the democratically elected government that was 
overthrown by the military on March 27, 2012.  
 
8. Finally, with regards to the African continent, it is advised that Nigeria, 
courtesy of being one of the planners and executors of institutions such as the 
OAU, ECOWAS, and the AU, among others, should take the lead in the 
building of more viable and effective economic communities in Africa. This 
would go a long way to reduce the plethora of conflicts the continent 
incessantly plays host to. After all, most of these conflicts are a function of 
agitations arising from economic stagnation and the inability of governments in 
the conflict zones to meet the basic expectations of their people. Nigeria should 
direct the path of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) 
towards poverty eradication on the continent. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no denying the fact that, since independence, Nigeria has pursued international peace 
aimed at achieving regional and global objectives; however, it remains to be seen whether 
this has paid off in terms of tangible and psychological benefits for Nigerians. Over the years, 
Nigerians have not been the net beneficiaries of their country‟s foreign policy. In terms of 
who gains, it appears that the nation‟s foreign policy has been too externally oriented, thus 
implying a lack of domestic focus. This failure constitutes a major weakness of the nation‟s 
foreign policy and it is the considered opinion of this researcher that a re-definition of 
Nigeria‟s foreign policy objectives has become imperative in order to bridge the discord 
between foreign policy and local expectation. Nigeria should endeavor to reconstruct the 
goals and values of her foreign policy to include what Nigerians as individuals can 
specifically gain from the nation‟s peacekeeping efforts.  
 
For instance, while it may be true that Nigeria‟s voyage into Liberia, was borne out of its 
commitment to and respect for its notion of four concentric circles and the larger foreign 
policy dictate of Afro-centrism, it remains to be seen how well the intervention paid off for 




      
questionable whether Nigerians were sufficiently protected in Liberia, despite the fact that 
their government was paying the price for Liberia‟s peace and stability. A case in point was 
the killing of two Nigerian journalists in 1990 (Tayo Awotunsin of The Champion 
Newspaper and Chris Imodibie of The Guardian) while on professional assignments in 
Liberia by forces loyal to the late Liberian war lord, Samuel Doe. The Nigerian government‟s 
response was a laughable ultimatum issued to the leadership of the country to either produce 
the killers of the journalist or be prepared to face dire consequences. The rest is of the story is 
history.  
 
It is also not out of place to ask how well the Nigerian government has taken care of the men 
and women of the armed forces who paid the supreme price for freedom and peace in Liberia; 
including the present state of the Nigeria/Liberia diplomatic relations. Worthy of mention in 
particular, is the diplomatic row which ensued between Nigeria and Liberia over the latter‟s 
expression of its willingness to allow the US army to make use of its territory as a base for 
AFRICOM25, notwithstanding Nigeria‟s strong opposition to the plan. There are many such 
questions, the answers to which may lie in Nigeria taking drastic and focused steps toward 
the adoption of a foreign policy approach that takes into cognizance the wellbeing of 
Nigerians in future intervention.   
 
Arising from the above analysis, and taking cognizance of the governments‟ proposed 
gravitation towards citizen diplomacy, it is advised that the government takes into 
consideration the welfare and well-being of its people in future intervention. The people must 
be the government‟s top priority. It is not just enough for the government to say it is shifting 
its foreign policy focus towards citizen diplomacy. Domestic considerations have an intrinsic 
place in foreign policy formulation. A foreign policy must be pursued as a continuation of a 
nation‟s domestic policy and Nigeria‟s domestic policy should be centered on people-
oriented governance.  
                                                          
   
25 According to the United States‟ Department of Defense, the United States Africa Command, also known as 
U.S. AFRICOM, is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
which focuses on Africa and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations in all 54 
African countries. Its main priority is to enable the Department of Defense, in conjunction with other 
components of the U.S. government to achieve a more stable environment where political and economic growth 
that furthers, protects and defends the national security interests of the United States can take place. This is 
intended to be achieved through the strengthening of the defense capabilities of African states and regional 
organizations and, when directed to do so, is also empowered to conduct military operations, in order to deter 





      
 
As Akinterinwa (2010) suggested, government must use its foreign policy to immediately 
address issues such as the refusal to grant entry visas to Nigerians who have legitimate 
documentation and reasons for wanting to travel, the shabby treatment Nigerians are 
confronted with at home and abroad and for Nigerian business entrepreneurs to benefit from 
the country‟s regional and sub-regional peace initiatives, particularly with regard to 
humanitarian aid that could be locally sourced. The welfare of Nigerians and the alleviation 
of mass poverty should be prioritized in the nation‟s foreign policy considerations. It is 
important that Nigerians be made the centerpiece of the country‟s foreign policy; this needs 
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